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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i. Korea's rapidly expanding economy, growing at about 10% per annum
during the period 1962-1973, has placed a severe demand pressure on the
transport system. In that period, freight traffic grew by nearly 12% per
annum, passenger traffic by about 13% and international port traffic by 22%.
Growing congestion in all modes of Korea's transport system led the Govern-
ment to a basic reorientation in its investment policy, and transport invest-
ment was increased from 17% of the Government's capital expenditure in the
First Plan Period (1962-1966) to about 27% in the Second and Third Plan Periods
(1967-1971 and 1972-1976).
ii. The Government's transport development strategy, which is based on
comprehensive sector studies, emphasizes; (i) the vital role of the railways
in the long distance transport of raw materials and other bulk commodities;
(ii) the increased importance of highway transport as a complementary mode
of traffic for freight and passengers, particularly over short and medium
distances; (iii) the need for major port improvement, expansion and organi-
zational reform; and (iv) the need for an effective organizational framework
to improve and coordinate transport policy and planning. While the imple-
mentation of that transport strategy has contributed a great deal to the
emergence of a more balanced transport system, capacity in the transport
sector is still insufficient, and congestion of all modes of transport
remains a problem.
iii. The evolution of a multimode transport system has ended the virtual
monopoly that the railways enjoyed in land transport only a decade ago. How-
ever, the Korean National Railroad (KNR) will continue to play a key role as
a least cost carrier of bulk traffic and substantial passenger traffic. KNR
will also be important in providing a rapid transit system for Seoul and its
suburbs since the electrification of the railway system in this area was
completed in August 1974.
iv. The management of KNR is generally satisfactory, and operating
efficiency is good, but needs improvement. Maintenance of rolling stock
and motive power is unsatisfactory, however, due to a lack of funds to acquire
spare parts, delays in procurement of plant and machinery for workshops,
and rapid increases in traffic demand resulting in the sacrifice of regular
maintenance. KNR proposes to acquire both spare parts to rehabilitate
existing out-of-service equipment and new rolling stock. MIaintenance is
expected to return to the normal standards by the end of 1977.
v. KNR's operations have, in the past, been reasonably profitable,
with passenger serv:Lces as the main contributor. This has been due to the
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G,overnment's policv of limiting, or denying, freight rate increases on the
grounds of curbing inflation, but permitting higher passenger fares than would
have been necessary to cover fully distributed costs. In 1971, there was a
diversion of railway passenger traffic to improved highways and buses, and
with costs affected by rising inflation and devaluation of the Won, KNR
suffered a net deficit. Since then a partial recovery has been made, with
further deficits in the years 1972-1974. Accelerated borrowing, both
externally from supplier's credits and bilateral sources, and internally from
Government financed institutions, has imposed on KNR a heavy debt service
burden, which, together with the annual net deficits, has resulted in a net
working capital deficiency. The proposed investment, coupled with the limi-
tation of further borrowings and relief from debt service obligations, to-
gether with the carrying out of various operational and financial improve-
ments including substantial tariff increases, all of which are recommended
in this report, should lead to the return of a satisfactory financial
situation. This would include adequate working capital, full debt service
coverage by 1978, and the earning of a rate of return on depreciated net
fixed assets of about 2.1%' by 1976, about 3.8% by 1977 and about 5.8%'
thereafter.
vi. The Project is KNR's Investment Plan during the years 1975-76
except investments carried over from, and financed by, the Third and Fourth
Railway Loans. It is designed to help implement Korea's development objectives
regarding the railways; to continue the upgrading, modernization and expan-
sion of KNR's track, rolling stock and motive power and other equipment; to
improve efficiency and to contribute to the improvement of the railway's
financial position. The Project is estimated to cost USS292 million equiva-
lent, of which US$185 million equivalent is in foreign exchange. Included
in the Project are an increase in station and line capacity and improvements
in simnalling (17%); acquisition of diesel and electric locomotives, spare
parts and repair facilities (23%); rolling stock (24%); track renewal and
improvement and bridge strengthening (12%); completion of electrification of
the remaining 71 km of industrial lines (4%); other miscellaneous items (3%);
and a contingency allowance of about 17%. The foreign exchange cost of the
Project would be financed by a proposed Bank loan of US$100 million, a US
Elxport-Import Bank loan of US$48.4 million, a European Consortium for
electrification finance of US$21.3 million, bilateral loans of about US$6.1
million and a West German loan of US$9.3 million. Local costs would be financed
from Government resources since KNR's financial situation does not enable it
to finanlce investments from internally generated funds.
vii. The proposed Bank loan would finance spare parts for diesel locomo-
tives, track material and equipment, fabricated bridge girders, 150 passenger
coaches, 1,500 freight cars, components for the rehabilitation of heating
equipment, wheel sets for passenger and freight cars, plant and machinery for
workshops and running sheds, technical assistance for maintenance of motive
power and rolling stock, and training of KNR staff. Procurement of loan-
financed items would be through international competitive bidding except for
US$8.7 million for spare parts for existing diesel locomotives and track
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maintenance equipment. Should Korean manufacturers win contracts for
manufacturing ordinary passenger cars and freight cars and supplying bridge
girders, disbursements from the proposed loan would be made against the
ex-factory cost of locally manufactured equipment and materials.
viii. The Project is economically justified. The Government's oil sub-
stitution program, of which the investments to increase MNR's coal carrying
capacity are an integral part (24% of KNR's planned investments), would
yield a first year benefit of over 50%. Other investments covering moderni-
zation and capacity extension for KNR (66% of KNR's planned investments) are
conservatively est.imated to yield an economic return of about 29%.
ix. The Project is suitable for a Bank loan of US$100 million equivalent
to the Republic of Korea for a 25 year term, including a five-year grace
period.

KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
I. INTRODUCTION
1.01 The Governiment of the Republic of Korea and the Korean National
Railroad (KNR) have asked the Bank for a loan of US$100 million equivalent
to finance part of i:he foreign exchange cost of KNRts Investment Plan for
1975-1976. KNR has been cailed upon to handle rapidly growing traffic and
has had to undertake extensive modernization and expansion to fulfill its
vital role in the Korean economy. Since 1962, Bank Group assistance to
KNR for four railway projects amounted to US$120 million equivalent, about
one thlird of the investment between 1962 and 1974. The first two lending
operations have been satisfactorily completed. The third is almost completed,
with an outstanding balance of about US$3 million out of a loan/credit of
US$55 million, due to delays in procurement of microwave equipment.
The Fourth Loan was made at the end of 1972 for US$40 million equivalent,
out of which about US$25 million have been disbursed. Because of
large cost increases, some items included in the Fourth Railway
Project were deleted and others reduced in quantity. Priority items which
could not be financed under the Fourth Loan, including rails for track
renewals and plant and machinery for track and workshops amounting to about
US$7.5 million, are being included in the proposed Project. A major item
(43 special passenger cars costing US$10.6 million) was deleted due to the
very high price quoted by the only bidder, which would not have justified
the investment. However, the proposed Project includes the procurement of
150 ordinary passenger cars, which are considered more urgent.
1.02 The proposed loan would be the fifth for KNR: it is designed to
continue the upgrading, modernization and expansion of KNR's track, rolling
stock and other equipment, and to contribute to the improvement of operations
and the railway's financial position, thus ensuring that KNR will continue
to play its vital role in the Korean transport system (paras 2.13 and 2.14).
KIR's investments for 1975-1976 are estimated at Won 156 billion (US$322
million equivalent), with a foreign exchange component of US$209 million
equivalent. The Project to be financed under the proposed loan is KNR's
Investment Plan for 1975-1976, excluding those items for which Bank financ-
ing is available under the Third and Fourth Railway Projects (Credit 183/
Loan 669-KO and Loan 863-KO). The Project is estimated to cost US$292 mil-
lion equivalent with a foreign exchange component of US$185 million equivalent.
1..3 Other Bankl Group assistance for transportation in Korea has
consisted of two highway loans (US$101.5 million equivalent) and one port
loan (US$80 milliort equivalent). The progress of work financed by these
loans has been satisfactory. In addition, the Bank contributed to the financing
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of a transportation survey in 1965 (US$0.2 million) and of a preinvestment
study of highways and transport coordination in 1968 (US$3.5 million), which
was refinanced through the First Highway Project. The Bank was also the
Executing Agency for a UNDP-financed port study, which resulted in the
First Ports Project in 1973. Annex 1 summarizes the Bank group operations
in the transport sector.
1.04 This appraisal is based on information supplied by the Government
and KNR and on the findings of a Bank mission in June/July 1974 comprising
Mtessrs. Abe (economist), DeLaney (financial analyst) and Tachibana (Engineer).
Following the reorganization of the Asia Region, Messrs. Hlavlicek (economist),
Chapman (financial analyst) and Murthy (engineer) participated in the
preparation of the appraisal report.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Transport Sector
(i) Development Strategy
2.01 The development of the transport sector in Korea is seen most
clearly when viewed in the context of the very rapid expansion of income,
production and international trade. During the period 1962-1973, gross
national product (GNP) increased by about 10% per annum, the value of ex-
ports by 30% and that of imports by 25% per annum. As a result of this
growth, total freight traffic in ton-km increased annually by nearly 12%,
passenger traffic in pass-km about 13% and international port traffic about
22%. Growing congestion in all modes of Korea's transport system led the
Government to a basic reorientation in its transport investment policy;
accordingly allocation of investment for transport was increased from 17%
of the Government's capital expenditure in the First Plan period (1962-1966)
to 27% in the Second Plan period (1967-71). During the Third Plan period
(197"-1976), about 26% (US$1,000 million) of total Government expenditure will
be invested in transport infrastructure. Wlile the increased transport in-
vestment contributed a great deal to the improvement of transport infra-
structure and equipment, capacity in the transportation sector is still
insufficient, and congestion in all modes of transport is a problem.
2.02 The Bank's lending strategy in thie transport sector is based on the
results of a comprehensive survey of land transportation modes completed in
1969, a transport coordination study made in 1970, a UNDP port development
study completed in 1972 and the Bank's continued association with, and
analysis of, the sector since 1962. In agreement with the Government, it
was concluded that: (a) on account of locational factors, the railway
could be expected to handle most of the country's long distance freight
traffic, of which a large proportion consisted of bulk commodities (coal,
ore, oil, fertilizer and cement); (b) thLe lack of adequate roads needed
urgent attention; (c) major ports required improvement, expansion and
organizational refcrms, including port management and operations; and
(d) an organization. for coordinating transport policy and planning was
needed to ensure rational investment planning and to develop adequate
transport policies.
(ii) Transport Planning and Coordination
2.03 Decision-making in investment planning is still unco-ordinated and
dispersed among different Government agencies, none of which plan on the
basis of comprehensive information regarding the whole transport sector
(Annex 2). The Ecconomic Planning Board, the agency responsible for formula-
tion of an investment policy at the macro-economic level, is not equipped to
study individual investment proposals comprehensively. Consequently, there
is no mechanism to study transport investment proposals in the context of
alternative possibilities in order to achieve the objectives of the Govern-
ment's stated transport and economic development strategy.
2.04 The Government has made efforts to improve transport coordination
and planning as recommended by the consultants who carried out the 1965 land
transportation survey. A more detailed study of transport coordination needs
was made by consulitants retained under the 1968 technical assistance credit
(Credit S4-KO). Following extensive discussions among the various Goveniment
agencies involved and the Bank, a Transportation Planning Office (TPO) was
set up under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) in
1970. Its main functions are to collect data, assist in the assessment of
major investment proposals and make technical and economic recommendations
in the field of long-term transport planning. TPO is controlled by, and
reports to, a Transport Coordination Ministers Conference (TCMC) consisting
of the eight cabinet members whose ministries are most concerned with trans-
port matters. TPO's work is supervised by a Transport Coordination Working
Group (TCWG), a Civil Service Committee on which the same ministries are re-
presented. TPO has encountered a series of teething troubles, especially
in recruiting adequately qualified staff.
2.05 Certain measures designed to increase TPO's effectiveness
were discussed during the negotiations for the Second Highway Project in
November 1973 and were to have been implemented during the course of 1974.
However, little progress was made largely because the Government had
not reached firm conclusions about TPO's functions. The Government
is currently reviewing TPO's work program for the next three years with a
view to taking measures to make it more effective. TPO's future role was
discussed further during negotiations for the proposed project in the light
of the findings of recent supervision missions and the Government's plans
for strengthening it. The Government has agreed, as a condition of effec-
tiveness of the proposed loan, to submit to the Bank its views on TPO's
future role and a time-phased plan to take the steps necessary to perform it.
Further, the Government undertook to implement the measures to be agreed
upon with the Bank to ensure the effective formulation and review of
policies and investment proposals related to the transport sector within
one year of the submission of the time-phased plan. A transport sector
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mission, due in Korea in late 1975, will review these matters and the general
question of road/rail transport coordination.
(iii) The Transport System
2.06 The development of the various transport modes in Korea has been
influenced by the nature of the terrain (about two-thirds of the land surface
is hilly); the concentration of economic activity and population around the
Seoul-Inchon and Busan areas; the location of domestic natural resources far
from industrial centers, e.g. coal, iron ore and limestone in the north,
northeast and center of the country; a long coastline with increasing indus-
trial activity; and the dependence on exports of manufactured goods and
imports of bulk raw materials.
2.07 The growth of traffic and of transport infrastructure and equipment
in each mode is shown in Tables 1 and 2; KNR has been handling growing
quantities of bulk and industrial commodities and passenger traffic; there
nlas also been a large expansion in coastal shipping. KNR accounted for 41%,
coastal shipping 35%, and road transport 24% of the total increase in freight
traffic during 1962-1973 (30%, 30% and 40%, respectively during 1967-1973).
As far as passenger traffic is concerned, however, road transport (73% of the
total pass-km in 1973) has captured most of the increase. From 1962 to 1973,
road passenger traffic increased almost sixfold from 5.5 to 32.1 billion
pass--km despite the limitations of the road network; this compares with a
twofold increase from 5.9 to 10.7 billion pass-km in railway traffic. The
explanation for this increase is the rapid development of urban traffic as
a result of a large increase in population in the major cities, as well as
the commencement of expressway bus service between Busan and Seoul, which
initially made heavy inroads into railway passenger traffic on that line.
However, the situation now seems to have stabilized (paras 3.11 and 3.12) and
railway passenger traffic has resumed its growth. There was a spectacular
growth in port traffic, from 7.5 million tons in 1962 to 57.8 million tons
in 1973, due mainly to increases in imports of bulk commodities such as oil,
grain and lumber and in coastal cargoes such as fuel, coal and cement.
Railway operations and traffic are discussed in detail in Chapter III, and
Annex 3 gives details of the development of the Transport Sector for
1962-1973.
_ighways
2.08 Only about 15% of the total 40,600 km highway network is paved,
and the vehicle density is among the lowest in Southeast Asia, with one
vehicle per 200 persons in 1973. Limited paving of the roads is due mainly
to the low priority given to developing the road network and the allocation
of a large part of the increased highway funds available during the 1968-1971
period to the construction of 640 km of toll expressways, of which 458 km are
four-lane divided (Seoul-Busan, 428 km; Seoul-Incheon, 30 km), and 182 km are
two-lane (Daejon-Jeonju, Suweon-Weonju). A major policy change occurred in
1971, shifting the emphasis from high standards of road construction to more
paving and lower construction standards adjusted to expected traffic levels.
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Also, the Government is beginning to recognize the importance of road main-
tenance. These changes were achieved partially through the First and Second
Highway Projects. Currently, road density is generally sufficient, but the
condition of most of the road network is still unsatisfactory. A plan of
action for the establishment of a highway maintenance field organization,
including procurement of equipment, was agreed between Government and the
Bank as an integral part of the Second Highway Project. However, implementation
of this plan has 1been delayed due to slow administration and legal procedures.
2.09 The relatively small number of vehicles in the country reflects the
import restrictions and the restrictive licensing policy for the road transport
industry. While, for balance of payments reasons, the Government is reluctant
to liberalize the importation of road vehicles and components for local
assembly, it has agreed in the Second Highway Project to eliminate, by June
1975, restrictive licensing policies such as minimum ownership of a certain
number of road vehicles for commercial transport and to remove limitations
on the use of the National Highway Network by trucks and buses.
Ports and Shipping
2.10 The infrastructure in ports also has capacity limitations.
Currently, the most important port is Busan, which is chronically congested.
The Government has been constructing various ports recently to serve new
industrial complexes, e.g. Incheon, Pohang, Ulsan and Masan. A study of
possible port improvements, by Lyon Associates (USA) and Economist Intel-
ligence Unit (UK), financed by UNDP xith the Bank as Executing Agency, was
completed in late 1972. Its recommendations became the basis for the First
Port Project (Loan 917-KO in 1973, US$80 million) covering Busan and 'Mug Ho.
2.11 Coastal shipping plays an important role in Korean transport (26a'
of the total freight traffic, in ton-km, in 1973), due mainly to the con-
struction of industrial complexes on coastal locations and the shortage of
rail and road capacity. Korea, like other countries, has been aiming at
the attainment of greater self-sufficiency in merchant shipping. About 22%
of the country's total foreign trade tonnage has been carried by Korean
vessels during the past three years. The shipbuilding industry in Korea
is rather new, but its production has been increasing rapidly as the result
of recent construction and expansion of shipyards at Busan and Ulsan.
Aviation
2.12 Air transport remains comparatively unimportant. The privately
operated Korean Air Lines (KAL) provides domestic and international flights.
Most international traffic is handled at the Seoul-Kimpo International Airport.
6. The Role of the Railways in the Transport System
2.13 Historically, the railways and coastal shipping have been the
major modes of transport in Korea. Road transport, particularly with regard
to passenger transport, has only since the last decade established itself
as an important means of transportation. As a result of the increased high-
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way expansion since 1968, road-rail competition has grown keener, with trucks
and buses competing for short distance traffic. Undoubtedly, the virtual
monopoly enjoyed by the railway only a decade ago has now ended, and the
transport system is evolving into a more balanced multi-modal system where
the different traffic modes complement each other according to their technical
and economic characteristics. Nevertheless, intermodal cost comparisons
show that rail transport is still the most important means of moving bulk
traffic economically over medium and long distances. Except for expressway
bus services, road and rail passenger traffic generally do not compete with
each other.
2.14 The continued preponderance of the railways in long-distance
freight and passenger traffic is explained to a large extent by the geographical
pattern of economic activity and the topographical characteristics of the
country, which make movement by rail the most economic means of transportation
for a large proportion of the total movement of commodities and passengers.
Domestic natural resources require heavy bulk transport to the industrial
areas; thus, about 76% (based on 1973 data) of rail freight traffic consists
of bulk commodities. In 1973, anthracite alone accounted for 37% of total
rail freight. In addition to its long-distance hauling, KNR will be important
in providing a rapid transit system for Seoul and its suburbs since the
electrification of the railway system in this area was completed in August
1974.
III. THE KOREAN NATIONAL RAILROAD
A. Organization, Management and Staff
3.01 In 1963, KNR was established as a semi-autonomous agency within
the Ministry of Transportation, with its own management, accounts and a
special section of the national budget, its accounts being kept separate,
as distinct from a Government department. The Government exercises control
over KNR in staff, financial and budgetary matters and over the allocation
of freight cars for important commodities such as coal, grains and fertilizer.
3.02 The Director General of KNR is appointed by the Minister of
Transportation and exercises his power through various bureaus. Chart 6847(R)
shows KNR's organization. The KNR management is generally satisfactory;
however, a shortage of senior qualified engineering, economic and accounting
staff, coupled with the size and complexity of KNR's investment program,
has led to the employment of consultants to study several aspects of railway
operation, finances and investment needs. Consultants are also being retained
by KNR for the electrification of KNR lines in the Seoul suburban area (part
of the rapid transit project for the Seoul metropolitan area) and implementation
of its commercial accounting system.
3.03 The number of permanent employees with Government civil servant
status was about 33,750 at the end of 1973, somewqhat less than the peak
figure of 36,067 employees in 1971. In addition, KNR employed about 2,700
workshop personnel, 1,000 security personnel and 2,300 others, including
some 2,000 seasonal temporary personnel for track works. The traffic units
(ton-km and pass-km) per employee during 1973 was 469,000, which is comparable
to Taiwan (462,000) and France (412,000) and considerably higher than that for
many other railways (U.K. 248,000; Italy 263,000).
3.04 Salaries per employee range from about Won 25,000 to about
Won 164,000 per month and are in line with Government pay scales; total
staff costs in 1973 were only about 42% of operating expenses as against
$'0%-70% in many other railways. Staff remuneration in KNR is lower than
t1at of industrial and commercial enterprises in Korea, and this has been
causing KNR some difficulties in recent years in retaining sufficient
qualified personnel. KNR has consequently been strengthening its recruit-
ment program through expansion of its training school and its training
curricula. KNR will submit to the Bank as part of a plan of action a
training program, for its review, as detailed in Annex 6. In general, the
staff displays excellent discipline and productivity.
B. Railway Property
3.05 The present position with regard to railway property and the
context in which improvements are now planned is described in Annex 4.
Track has generally been well maintained; however, with the growth of
traffic, a.change in maintenance procedures is necessary on some main
lines, and the track must be improved. This is planned, together with
replacement and strengthening of bridges. Modernization of signalling is
also required and is being undertaken. Marshalling facilities in yards and
stations, particularly in the Seoul area, need to be augmented.
3.06 KNR's motive power and rolling stock position at the end of 1973
is given in Table 3. KNR is almost fully dieselized or electrified, but has
some steam locomotives which are used for shunting operations. The phasing
out of steam locomotives, scheduled for 1974, has been postponed beyond the
end of 1976 in order to facilitate the planned improvement of maintenance
of diesel locomotives, which has been neglected. About 100 passenger cars
and 220 freight cars will be scrapped during 1975-76.
3.07 KNR's facilities for maintenance and repair of motive power and
rolling stock need to be improved and reorganized (para 3.15); the problem
was previously studied by Touche Ross & Co. (Canada) in 1971, financed under
Credit 183/Loan 669. The recommendations of the consultants were accepted
by KNR but have not yet been fully implemented due to delays in procurement
of parts and workshop machinery machinery (paras. 3.14 and 3.15). Difficulties
in acquiring land were encountered with regard to KNR's earlier plans for
a freight car workshop at Dae Joen; a substitute is to be built at Hae Dok.
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C. Traffic and Operations
(i) Freight Traffic
3.08 KNR's freight traffic statistics from 1964 through 1973 are
summarized in Table 4. During this period, freight traffic grew 7.2% per
annum in tons and 7.4% per annum in ton-km. Major commodities which con-
tributed to these increases were coal and cement; coal transportation in-
creased from 8.3 million tons in 1964 to 13.6 million tons in 1973 and cement
from 1.1 million tons to 7.5 million tons during the same period. In 1973,
freight traffic was 37.8 million tons and 8.6 billion ton-km, with an
average freight transport distance of 228 km. Freight net ton-km per route-
km was 2.74 million in 1973. Traffic density is highest on KNR's industrial
lines between the Seoul area and the northeastern parts of Korea, which carry
large volumes of coal and cement, followed by those between Seoul and Busan.
3.09 Bulk commodities such as coal, cement, oil, fertilizer, ore and
grains constituted 76% of KNR's total freight ton-km in 1973; the remainder,
consisting mainly of general goods suitable for highway transport, increased
about 0.3 billion ton-km in 1973 from about 1.2 billion ton-km in 1971 and
1372. This completely reversed the trend of 1969-1972, when highway trans-
port development caused this category of freight traffic to decline signif-
icantly. Part of the increases can be explained by railway container services
between Seoul and Busan which were introduced in September 1972, and the
lack of highway transport capacity.
3.10 Table 5 shows KNR's freight traffic forecasts from 1974 through
1979, which take into account the prospective competitive siutation, ex-
pected increases in the production and distribution of coal, cement and
fertilizer, and increases in railway capacity arising from the implementa-
tion of the proposed project. The average traffic growth rate is expected
to be 8.7% per annum and to reach 62.6 million tons and 14.2 billion ton-km
in 1979, with the basic composition of traffic remaining unchanged. These
forecasts were discussed and agreed with the Economic Planning Board (EPB)
and KNR and are considered realistic.
(ii) Passenger Traffic
3.11 Table 6 shows KNR's passenger statistics from 1964 through 1973.
During the period 1964-1969, traffic increased by 5.5% per annum in passengers
and by 3.5% per annum in pass-km and reached 55 million passengers and
11 billion pass-km in 1969. However, during 1970 and 1971, the long-distance
passenger traffic decreased substantially from 9.7 billion pass-km in 1969
to 7.3 billion pass-km in 1971, due to the opening of the Seoul-Busan ex-
presswav in 1970 and the introduction of a large number of air-conditioned
bouses. In 1972, KNR's long-distance passenger traffic began to increase
again and reached 9.7 billion pass-km in 1973. The recent increase is
attributable to improvements in KINR passenger services, mainly increases
in thle frequency of limited express train services, and an increase in bus
fares in 1972, which meant a wider differential between rail and bus fares
in favor of KNR. A detailed analysis of modal competition between rail and
road is in Annex 3.
3.12 KNR statistics for commuter traffic show a decline mainly due to
changes in the school zoning system in the spring of 1972, which reduced
the number of student commuters. However, KNR's commuter statistics record
only season ticket holders, and, following the increases in effective com-
muter rates for February 1972, some passengers resorted to the purchase of
regular tickets; the decline, therefore, may be more apparent than real.
In 1973, commuter traffic represented 16% of the total number of passengers
and about 5% of the pass-km.
3.13 Table 7 shows KNR's passenger traffic forecast from 1974 through
1979, which allows for expected increases in travel demand induced by econo-
mic growth, completion of the KNR-operated Seoul Metropolitan Electrified
Suburban Railway System (SMESRS), and development of the highway network
and highway transport. In 1979, SMESRS's traffic is expected to reach
200 million passengers and 3 billion pass-km, and short-distance passenger
traffic on other KNR systems is expected to rise to 100 million passengers
and about 3 billion pass-km; long-distance (including military) traffic is
expected to increase to about 72 million passengers and 13 billion pass-km.
Long-distance passenger traffic is expected to rise slowlv since the paving
program and the construction of expressways is likely to lead to some
diversioni of rail passenger traffic, especially on sections other than the
Seoul-Busan and the Seoul suburban area.
(iii) 2perations
3.14 Table 8 gives a summary of KNR's operating statistics from 1969 to
1973. It shows that operating efficiency and utilization of locomotives and
rolling stock continue to be good. Ilowever, analyses of the availability
of diesel locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars indicate that KNR has
ignored their regular maintenance schedule, resulting in a considerable number
standing idle and awaiting repair (Annex 4); this, in turn, reduces avail-
abilitv and causes furt'her inevitable ignoring of the maintenance schedule.
Consultants (Touche Ross & Co.) recommended the improvement of the main-
tenance operation. The recommendation has not yet been carried out mainly
because of insufficient funds to acquire spare parts, delays in procurement
of plant and machinery for workshops and running sheds, and higher than
expected traffic inicreases and consequent demand for rolling stock, resulting
in the sacrifice of regular maintenance.
3.15 To restore the maintenance of diesel locomotives, passenger cars
and freight cars to normal, KNR will submit to the Bank a detailed, time-
phased plan of action, not later than three months after signing of the
proposed loan, incLuding the rehabilitation of cannibalized diesel locomo-
tives. The plan of action aims at achieving this by the end of 1977 and
proposes raising availabilities to about 85% for diesel locomotives, about
90% for passenger cars and about 93% for freight cars. It will be based
on, inter alia, the suggested terms of reference given in Annex 5 and will
take into account the recommendations made in the report by Messrs. Touche
Ross (June 1971) on maintenance and repairs of diesel locomotives. The
- 10 -
plan of action will also cover the rationalization of the number of major
running sheds and of the maintenance work between repair workshops and
running sheds. As part of the plan of action, adequate funds, in local or
foreign currency as required, would be made available to KNR by the Govern-
ment on an annual basis to finance the purchase of urgently needed spare
parts (Annex 5). To assist in carrying out the plan of action, KNR will
appoint a technical adviser for a period of about 2 years.
3.16 In order to improve the quality of its long-distance passenger
service, KNR originally planned to purchase 50 additional air-conditioned
cars and 150 ordinary cars. However, in view of recent high prices of air
conditioned cars, KNR has agreed to limit its requirements to only 150
ordinary cars. In keeping with modern trends in economic design of light-
weight passenger cars, the new cars will be specified with a tare weight
of not more than 30 tons each.
3.17 To maintain good operating performance and to ensure optimum uti-
lization of the rolling stock, improvements in the signalling system, in
marshalling yards and in stations, etc., are needed. These are provided
for in the project. KNR's effort to improve operations include the recent
introduction of more block trains for coal, cement and containers.
IV. THE PLAN AND THE PROJECT
A. KNR's Investment Plan (1975-1976)
4.e11 KNR's original 1975-1976 Investment Plan has been revised in con-
sultation with the Bank in the light of increases in both local and foreign
costs, a higher than anticipated traffic growth, and a change in national
policy regarding increased utilization of coal reserves following the oil
price increases. The revised Plan as agreed between the Government and the
Bank comprises investments totalling Won 156 billion (US$322 million) with
a foreign exchange component of Won 101 billion (US$209 million). A detailed
description of the items included in the Plan is given in Annex 6 and Table 9.
4.02 The Plan as now drawm up assumes continued high utilization and
improved availability of passenger and freight cars. Signalling improve-
ments and better yard and terminal facilities with the planned investments
should make this possible.
4.03 It has been agreed between the Government and the Bank that no
substantial changes in the Plan involving more than Won five billion are
to be macle without the Bank's prior concurrence.
4.04 KNR has drafted a tentative investment program for the period
1977-1979 amounting to about Won 210 billion (US$432 million) and comprising
large capacity extension investments such as track doubling and increases in
rolling stock and motive power. Its technical, financial and economic
justification has not yet been established. In view of this the Government
has agreed that, before any commitments are made on the items in this pro-
gram, the Bank will be consulted regarding their technical, financial and
economic feasibility.
B. The Project and the Proposed Loan
4.95 The Project to be financed under the proposed loan is KNR's
1975-1976 Investment Plan, excluding those items which are being financed
under the Third ancd Fourth Railway Projects (Credit 183/Loan 669-KO and
Loan 863-KO). The proceeds of the Fourth Loan are not sufficient to finance
the purchiase of all the items originally included. The items for which
financing was not available and did not materially affect the objectives
of the loan have been deleted, but high priority track maintenance material
and equipment, and plant and machinery for workshops and running sheds,
estimated at a cost of US$7.5 million, are being included in the Project
and will be financed under the proposed loan (Annex 6).
4.06 The Fifth Railway Project includes the completion of the electrifi-
cation of about 71 km of the industrial lines and the Seoul suburban section,
most of which have commenced operation; completion of centralized traffic
control (CTC) in Seoul, already started; double tracking of the Ho Nam and
Tae Baeg Lines; improvements to marshalling yards; bridge strengthening;
acquisition of diesel and electric locomotives and spare parts; acquisition
of passenger and freight cars and wheelsets; acquisition of components for
heating cars; plant: and machinery for workshops and running sheds; provision
of the services of a technical adviser; and provision of KNR staff training.
Details are given in Annex 6 and Table 10. The proposed loan would cover
acquisition of rails, spare parts for motive power, rolling stock and spares,
plant and machinerv for workshops and running sheds, provision of advisory
services, and staf,f training. The remaining items, including electrification,
locomotives, signaLllng and track works, are being financed by other agencies
(para 4.09). There is no retroactive financing.
C. Cost Estimates
4.07 The tota:L cost of the Project is estimated at Won 141 billion
(US$292 million equivalent) with a foreign exchange component of US$185
million of which USi$100 million would be covered by the proposed loan.
The following table summarizes the estimated Project expenditure and items
to be financed by the proposed loan.
4.08 The Project costs are based on estimated prices at end of 1974
adjusted for price escalation and physical contingencies. Physical con-
tingencies of about 10% have been included in the Project for all items
except those with a particularly firm limit on quantities, such as
locomotives and rolling stock. Price contingencies have been included for
all items except for local costs on civil works for which firm contracts
have already been awarded in 1975 (valued at Won 15 billion). The pro-
vision for contingencies on local costs of civil works is an increase of
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Project Expenditure 1975-1976
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Loan Items
------- W billion --------- --------- us$ million…--- US$ million
1. New line construction 0.60 - 0.60 1.24 - 1.24 -
2. Electrification
(a) Industrial lines electrification 0.92 3.05 3.97 1.89 6.29 8.18 -(b) Seoul suburban electrification 0.83 1.41 2.24 1.71 2.91 4.62 -
3. Increase in station and line capacity
(a) Signalling 5.55 3.71 9.26 11.44 7.64 19.08 -(b) Double tracking (27.3 km.) 4.43 
- 4.43 9.14 - 9.14 -(c) Other works 2/ 9.16 0.81 9.97 18.89 1.68 20.57 1.7 3/
4. Way and structure renewals and improvements and 9.26 7.11 16.37 19.09 14.65 33.74 14.6
track maintenance equipment
5. Motive power and rolling stock
(a) Diesel locomotives (50 new), spare parts and
repowering 52 locomotives 0.29 24.43 24.72 0.60 50.37 50.97 8.2 i/(b) Electric locomotives (10) and spare parts 0.25 5.64 5.89 0.52 11.63 12.15 -(c) Passenger cars (150) and wheelsets 0.11 8.94 9.05 0.23 18.44 18.67 18.5(d) Freight cars (2,000) and wheelsets 1/ 4.12 17.53 21.65 8.49 36.14 44.63 36.1(e) Other 2/ 2.60 1.20 3.80 5.36 2.48 7.84 1.4 5/
6. Motive power and rolling stock repair 0.62 1.26 1.88 1.28 2.59 3.87 2.6
facilities
7. Miscellaneous
(a) Technical assistance and staff training 
- 0.15 0.15 - 0.30 0.30 0.3(b) Other 2/ 2.67 0.21 2.88 5.51 0.44 5.95 -
8. Total 1 to 7 41.41 75.44 116.84 85.39 157.56 240.95 83.8
9. Contingencies
(a) Physical 3.96 2.78 6.74 8.15 5.74 13.89 3.0(b) Price 6.30 11.54 17.84 12.99 23.79 36.78 j,,j
10. GRAND TOTAL / 51.67 89.76 141.43 136.53 185.08 291.61 100.0
NOTE:
1/ In this table bridge girders. Passenger cars and freight cars except 500 gonclola cars procured i3 1974,have been assumed asfully importeA. (500 ondola cars were procured locally in late 1974 with Gove!rnment finance and nayment is being made in 1975as part of the projec- 
2/ See Table 10 for details.
3/ Consists of rails for line capacity increase.
4/ The prelposed lean will finance spare parts only. Locomotives financed by US Export-Import Bank.5/ The proposed loan will finance only equipment for heating cars. Balance for the roerngining of rail cars beingfinanced by Coveanment (on going scheme).
§/ Figures rounded.
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16% for 1975 and 14S% for 1976 and for equipment and foreign costs of civil
works 12% increase for 1975 and 10% increase for 1976. Contingencies,
physical and price on all items taken together represent about 17% of
Project costs.
D. Financing of the Proiect
4.09 The finanicing plan proposed for the Project is summarized below:
Won US$ Million
Billion Equivalent %
Government 51.7 106.5 36.5
IBRD Loan 48.5 100.0 34.3
U.S. Export-Import Bank 23.5 48.4 16.6
Kreditanstalt Fur
Wiederaufbau (KFW) 4.5 9.3 3.2
European Consortium (for
electrification) 10.3 21.3 7.3
Suppliers' Cr,edits and
other 2.9 6.1 2.1
TOTAL 141.4 291.6 100.0
4.10 The proposed loan would be to the Government, repayable over 25
years, including a five-year grace period.
E. Execution of the Project. Procurement
4.11 KNR will be responsible for the implementation of the Project. It
has the necessary facilities and is competent to carry out the Project.
4.12 Under the Fourth Loan, procurement has been rather slow, due to
(i) the lack of qualified staff and (ii) lack of a well defined division
of procurement responsibilities between KNR and the Office of Supply of the
Republic of Korea (OSROK). To rectify this situation KNR has increased the
number of procurement staff and OSROK is strengthening its railway procure-
ment arrangements.
4.13 All items to be procured under the proposed loan, except spare
parts needed to build up a stock sufficient for the existing track mainte-
nance machines and those for adequate regular maintenance of diesel locomo-
tives, will be subject to international competitive bidding in accordance with the
with the Bank guidelines. Procurement of the spare parts will be negotiated
with original suppliers in consultation with the Bank. Their estimated costs
are US$0.5 million for track maintenance machines and US$8.2 million for
diesel locomotives, making a total of US$8.7 million. Should local bids,
in response to international tenders for bridge girders, passenger and freight
cars, wheel sets End portal cranes, be successful, local cost financing to the
extent of the equivalent of US$27 million would be involved. In bid evalua-
tion, Korea manufacturers of equipment, provided the domestic value added is
at least 20% of the ex-factory bid price of the goods in question, will be
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allowed a preferential margin of 15% of the c.i.f. cost of competing imports,
or the relevant prevailing level of customs duties, whichever is lower.
F. Disbursement
4.14 Disbursements would be made as follows:
100% - of the c.i.f. cost of imported equipment and
materials; and/or
100% - of the ex-factory cost of locally manufactured
equipment and materials if local bidders are
successful;
100% - of the foreign exchange cost of technical
assistance.
Any savings under the loan would be used to finance additional, but similar,
project items subject to review and agreement with the Bank.
4.15 The items to be financed under the loan and the estimated quarterly
rate of disbursement are given in Table 11. Disbursements are based on the
assumption that the proposed loan would become effective by July 15, 1975.
V. ECONOMIC EVALUATION
5.01 The original KNR Investment Plan for 1972-1976, as a whole was
appraised as the Fourth Railway Project (Loan 863-KO) in 1971-1972. About
50% of the Plan expenditures was allocated to electrification of the in-
dustrial lines and of the Seoul suburban area of KNR. Assessment of the
original Investment Plan indicated that the total economic benefits would
yield an economic return of about 20%. Most of the works related to the
electrification have been completed; also the other works have been carried
out. From the time of the appraisal of the Fourth Project, traffic increased
more than expected; costs of equipment and materials increased sharply; and
coal transport has become more important due to the oil price increases. In
the light of these circumstances, the Government and KNR revised the KNR
Investment Plan for 1975-1976. KNR's revised Investment Plan for 1975-1976
has two important elements:
(a) investments to increase the capacity for coal transport
(covering about 32% of the Plan); and
(b) other investments, which cover track renewals and bridge
strengthening, track equipment, signalling and telecommuni-
cations, purchase of motive power, freight cars and pas-
senger cars, improvement of workshops and sheds, and some
yard and line capacities.
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These are designed to ensure the efficient operation of KNR by increasing its
capacity to handle the growing traffic, limiting to a minimum increases in
operating costs and improving the quality of service and safety.
5.02 Investmen,ts related to coal transport are intended to enable KNR
to carry increasing long-distance coal traffic between the production points
in the northeastern part of Korea and the consumption points. The railway
is the most efficient means of coal transport since there are no economi-
cally feasible alternatives. In 1973, KNR carried 13.6 million tons and
3.2 billion ton-km of coal, and, by 1976, coal traffic will reach 17.6
million tons and 4.1 billion ton-km (against the original 1972 estimate of
13.8 million tons aLnd 3.2 billion ton-km). The substantial increase in coal
traffic estimates resulted from the increases of oil prices, which have
affected Korea's balance of payments situation adversely. In 1973, petroleum
imports, upon which the bulk of the country's energy sources now depends,
were estimated at about 110 million barrels, at a cost of US$330 million
equivalent (based on c.i.f. prices). In 1974, the total cost of crude oil
imports would amournt to US$1,200 million; the incremental increase in import
bills is equivalent: to 80% of the estimated current account deficit for 1974.
5.03 The Government has taken measures to conserve energy in order to
save foreign exchange expenditure, and is encouraging coal production. It
is estimated that, by increasing coal production by 3 million tons, Korea's
savings in crude oil would amount to 12.4 million barrels in 1974, or US$126
million. Thus, each ton of coal would save about four barrels of oil, giving
a benefit cost ratio of about 3.3:1 at present prices (Annex 7). The econo-
mic benefit of investments in coal transport will, therefore, be in the form
of foreign exchange savings. It is expected that these investments, total-
ing about US$180 million, including that of KNR, would produce gross foreign
exchange savings of about US$109 million in 1975 and US$126 million in 1976.
Taking into account coal production cost of US$31 million in 1975 and US$38
million in 1976, the first year return on the investment would be over 50%.
Even if the price of oil were to be reduced by, say, 30% to about US$7 per
barrel, the first year benefit alone would still be a satisfactory 36%.
5.04 Of the other items in the Investment Plan for 1975-76, covering
68/. of the total Plan, some are carried over from 1972-1974; they include
the electrification works on the industrial lines and the Seoul suburban
lines and the procurement of 97 passenger coaches which are excluded from
the analysis. The remaining items, covering 59% of the Plan, include pur-
chase of freight cars and passenger coaches; improvement in line capacity
by signalling and marshalling yard installations, and by double tracking
and increase in crossing loops. Most of these items are intended to in-
crease capacity, but some are strictly replacements; e.g., some freight
and passenger cars, track renewals and bridge strengthenings. Benefits
deriving from these items would be avoided increases in KNR's operating
costs and avoidance of diversion of traffic to other modes at higher cost.
Estimating potential vehicle operating cost savings at a conservative 60%
of possible savings, the economic rate of return would be about 29%.
Assuming that the capital cost of the Project would be higher by 20% and,
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at the same time railway operating cost per traffic unit.1/ would be higher
by 5%, in real terms, the economic return would still be a satisfactory 21%.
Details of the economic evaluation are given in Annex 7.
VI. FINANCIAL EVALUATION
A. Background
6.01 KNR earned profits through 1970, but the situation changed in
the following years, due to inflation and inadequate tariff increases. KNR's
financial situation has deteriorated and this can jeopardize management's
ability to execute the Investment Plan. KNR could operate with continuing
losses and maintain a sound financial position if the Government would in-
Ject new equity capital into the enterprise, but, it clearly cannot operate
with continuing losses if such periodic injections are not forthcoming.
Unfortunately, the Government has relied on the exclusive use of debt with
resulting increased interest charges and annual debt repayments. This com-
bination or lower earnings and increased debt service has resulted in working
capital deficits, prohibiting management from purchasing sufficient materials
and supplies to properly maintain the railroad.
6.02 The need to improve KNR's financial situation was noted in the
appraisal report and discussed with the Korean authorities during appraisal
and negotiations related to the Fourth Railway Project (Loan 863-KO) which
was approved in November 1972. In view of the decrease in passenger traffic,
slow growth of freight traffic and increased costs in 1970-71, it did not
appear that KNR could earn a net income prior to 1975. Accordingly, Section
4.07 of the Loan Agreement did not require KNR to earn a rate of return
through 1974 and only 2% in 1975, 3% in 1976, and 5% from 1978 thereafter.
In fact KNR's accounts show that the railroad earned a rate of return of
almost 1% in 1972, 1.1% in 1973, but no return in 1974. While, in agreement
with the Bank, the Government permitted KNR to raise freight tariffs by 25%
in 1972 followed, in early 1974, by freight tariff increases of 15% combined
with a 25% passenger fare increase, due to the lack of adequate working
capital, KNR was forced to ignore maintenance of its motive power fleet and
rolling stock thus understating expenses and overstating its rate of return.
The urgency of mounting a major maintenance program coupled with financing
KNR's future capital expenditures, while costs have grown considerably due
to worldwide inflation, makes it imperative for the Government to assist KNR
in accelerating its financial recovery. This situation is re-examined later
in this chapter together with the specific measures agreed upon to meet this
end.
1/ "Traffic unit" = passenger-km/ton/km.
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B. Tariffs and Costs
6.33 Tariffs are common throughout the system and are regulated by
Government agencies rather than KNR. As part of the Government's policy
of exercising controls on the prices of essential commodities, railway
tariffs, in particular freight rates, have been held at low levels, the
average revenue per ton-km and pass-km being Won 1.8 (USI0.46) and Won 2.1
(US40.53), respectLvely in 1973.
6.04 Tariff increases granted during the 1967-1973 period were as follows:
Freight Rates Average Revenue/ Passenger Average Revenue/
Increase ton-km Fares Increase pass-km
Won Won
1967 30% (Oct.) 1.19 50% (Oct.) 1.12
1968 - 1.42 - 1.46
1969 - /a 1.52 30% (Dec.) 1.64
1970 - 1.45 - 1.97
1971 - 1.48 - 1.98
1972 20% (Feb.) 1.84 - /b 2.06
1973 - 1.84 - 2.14
/a Changes were made in commodity classification only.
lb There were reductions in commuter ticket discount.
During this period, the wholesale price index in Korea rose by about 9% per
annum. While increases in passenger fares were more than rises in costs,
there was a decline in freight yields due to traffic increases being mainly
in low-rated commodities and to high-rated goods being lost to road transport.
In order to meet the requirements of Loan 863-KO, and to help offset increases
in fuel costs and wages, the Government allowed KNR to retain, as from
Februarv 1, 1974, the 10% transportation tax on passenger fares, which had
been in force since 1963, and authorized an increase of 25% in passenger
fares from February 13, 1974. Freight rates were raised by 10% from January
1, 1974, by 5% from February 13, 1974 and on December 15, selective increases
of between 35% and 40% were made to various classes of freiglht, excluding
coal. This latter tariff adjustment gave an average increase in freight
revenues of about. 25% to about Won 2.7 (US10.55) per ton-km. A further rise
of 10%.' in both passenger fares and freight rates is expected effective in
April, 1975.
6.05 KNR's operating costs are low, due to a high degree of utilization
of rail facilities and rolling stock and to low salaries and wages. A cost
analysis indicates that, during 1972, the average fully distributed costs
were about Won 1.7 (USd0.42) per pass-km and Won 2.4 (US40.60) per freight
ton-km; these costs are understated, since KNR's provision for maintenance
was below the minimum level and the depreciation provision was also in-
adequate. Nevertheless, the conclusion drawn from comparing these costs
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with the revenues given in the above table is that passenger fares have
exceeded fully distributed costs, but that freight rates have not. In view
of growing road competition for passengers, KNR should correct the present
situation of excessive dependence on passenger traffic for its net revenues
by raising freight tariffs (para 6.14 and Annex 8).
6.06 A 1970 traffic costing study by consultants (Touche Ross & Co.,
(Canada)), financed by the Bank, suggested some improvements in KNR's traffic
costing procedures. The same consultants have been retained by KNR to imple-
ment its commercial accounting system by 1976; improvements in traffic cost-
ing procedures will be included. KNR will then have better costing data for
management purposes, and during negotiations, agreement was reached on a
specific program for implementing the new accounting and traffic costing
system by 1976 (para 6.25).
C. Past Performance
6.07 Income statements for the years 1969 through 1973 are given in
Table 12 and are summarized below:
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Billions of Won
Total Operating Revenues 31.7 33.0 31.2 36.3 41.6
Less: Total Cash Expenses 20.2 23.8 27.8 30.0 34.0
Depreciation 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9
Total Operating Expenses 23.8 27.7 31.8 34.5 38.9
Net Operating Revenue (loss) 7.9 5.3 (0.6) 1.8 2.7
Less: Interest Charges 1.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 6.5
Net Railway Revenue (loss) 6.3 3.5 (3-9) (4-0) (3.8)
Less: Other Revenue (Expense) /a (1.8) (0.5) (0.7) 0.1 (3.3)
Net Revenue (losses) 4.5 3.0 (4.6) (3.9) (7.1)
Add: Government Subsidy (Cash) 1.5
Net Income (Adjusted) 4.5 3.0 (4.6) (3.9) (5.6)
Net Cash Revenues 8.1 6.9 (0.6) 0.6 0.7
Interest Charge Coverage (times) 4.9 2.9 - 0.3 0.4
Debt Service Coverage (times) 3.4 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.5
Rate of Return on Net Fixed
Assets 4.5% 3.0% - 0.9% 1.1%
/a In 1973, largely a loss on foreign exchange fluctuations.
6.08 Throughout the sixties and including 1970, passenger profitability
aided by fare increases was adequate to offset losses on freight operation,
and net revenues were sufficient to cover debt service and make some
contribution to investment. Examination of KNR's traffic data and yields
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indicates that passenger traffic declined by 17% from 1969 to 1971, while
freight traffic increased but not fast enough to generate adequate income
despite the tariff increases of 1967 and 1972 (para 6.04). While the
position has improved slightly since 1971, the fact is the revenue base is
insufficient to meet KNR's increasing costs.
6.09 KNR's balance sheets, given in Table 13 are summarized below:
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Billions of Won
Current Assets 7.0 7.0 11.7 7.7 9.9
Net Fixed Assets /a 183.4 186.7 196.5 229.8 340.6
Other Assets lb 9.6 17.5 46.3 4.5 6.5
Total Assets 200.0 211.2 254.5 242.0 357.0
Current Liabilities 7.7 10.6 16.4 19.6 18.3
Long-Term Liabilities 32.1 35.0 75.3 80.5 100.5
Other Liabilities - - - 1.0 1.3
Net Equity /a 160.2 165.6 162.8 140.9 236.9
Total Liabilities 200.0 211.2 254.5 242.0 357.0
Net Working Capital (deficiency) (0.7) (3.6) (4.7) (11.9) (8.4)
/a Includes a Won 98.7 billion (US$24.7 million) re-valuation of assets in
1973.
/b Other assets include: investments, deposits, deferrals, prepayments.
As shown by the above table, current financial weakness is evidenced by
continued large working capital deficits and the rise in long-term debt.
Details of the lorLg-term liabilities at December 31, 1963, are given in
Table 14.
6.10 Included, in the current assets are inventories, valued at Won 4.0
billion at the enc of 1973, which have not been physically verified. KNR,
with the assistance of its accounting consultants, is presently installing
an inventory control system, and has commenced a physical verification of
high value items. Deficiencies in the accounting for fixed assets have
been consistently pointed out by the Auditors, and have resulted in in-
sufficient provision for depreciation. At negotiations it was agreed that
KNR would, by December 1976, carry out a revaluation of fixed assets with
a consequent adjustment to annual depreciation.
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6.11 When the Fourth Railway Project was prepared, it was agreed that
the Bank's agreement should be obtained before KNR incurred any debt, (other
than the Government loans to KNR of 1972 and 1973 already indicated to the
Bank), should KNR's net cash revenues be less than 1.2 times the maximum
debt service requirement. Since then, although KNR's operating results have
been slightly better than forecast, net cash revenues have not been sufficient
to achieve this ratio. In addition the outstanding debt as of the end of
1973 rose to US$257 million, with a consequent large rise in debt service
requirements. The total debt outstanding at end of 1973 included IDA credits
and Bank loans amounting to US$84.0 million, Overseas Economic Cooperation
Fund (Japan) loans of US$37.4 million, US$51.2 million for electrification
from the European manufacturers consortium, U. S. Government Foreign Aid
loans of US$21.4 million, miscellaneous foreign loans and suppliers credits
of US$13.0 million, and borrowing from the Korea Development Bank equivalent
to US$50 million. Although the interest and repayment terms have been
reasonable, the present debt service burden is such that future borrowing
must be restricted to the minimum requirements. The debt limitation conve-
nant included in the Fourth Railway Loan Agreement was reaffirmed at
negotiations.
D. Financial Trends
6.12 In order to put the present in perspective with past results and
future prospects, a trend analysis incorporating the growth in KNR's key
financial data appears in Table 15 a brief review of which shows several
key trends: (i) total operating expenses continuing to increase at a faster
rate than total revenues from 1970 until a balance is expected in 1978;
(ii) interest charges since 1970 growing over three times as fast as revenues,
(iii) KNR's first net loss occurring in 1971 and the railroad is not expecting
to return a profit, after all expenses (including interest) until 1978, (iv)
KNR's net cash income, i.e., net income plus depreciation less debt service,
contributing little or no internally generated funds towards investment from
1971 to 1978, (v) since 1971, KNR incurring long term debt at more than
double the rate of the increase in its total resources, (vi) by 1974, KNR's
total asset index doubled and is increasing at a faster rate than KNR's
ability to generate revenues, (vii) the interest charge index increasing at
a more rapid rate than the long term debt index due chiefly to rising interest
rates. It is evident that proposals for investment after the project period
must be closely examined in the light of benefits, and that the rise in debt
must be checked.
E. Future Prospects
6.13 Because of the past inadequate tariff policy, KNR's rates and fares
must be raised to a level at which the railway can maintain adequate working
capital while meeting all operating costs and debt service. The necessary
tariff increases being proposed in Annex 8 have been phased on an annual
basis, largely to reduce the impact on the national economy. Those recommended
for 1976 and 1977 are necessary to overcome the effects of devaluation of
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the won and increases in fuel and other costs in late 1974; the tariff
increases proposed for 1978 and 1979 are necessary to cover inflation of
about 10% per annum.
6.14 Accordingly, agreement was reached at negotiations that action
would be taken, including tariff increases on the lines of those proposed
in Annex 8, as necessary for KNR to generate revenues sufficient to enable
it to cover all cash expenses, including debt service, by 1978 and to main-
tain a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of no less than 1.2
by 1979. In order to achieve this it was agreed that KNR should earn rates
of return of about 2.1% by 1976, 3.8% by 1977 and about 5.8% thereafter.
6.15 Projected income statements for the years 1975-79, based on assump-
tions detailed in Annex 8 are given in Table 12. The revenue forecasts take
into account the tariff revisions of December 1974. The income statements
for the years 1974-79 are summarized below and depend heavily on the execu-
tion of the plan for financial recovery.
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Billions of Won
Total Operating Revenues 53.8 74.9 96.2 116.1 139.2 152.3
Less: Total Cash Expenses 48.2 63.3 77.6 85.7 95.1 105.6
Depreciation 5.9 7.3 9.2 10.9 12.0 13.1
Total Operating Expenses 54.1 70.6 86.8 96.6 107.1 118.7
Net Operating Revenue (Loss) (0.3) 4.3 9.4 19.5 32.1 33.6
Less: Interest Charges 6.9 11.9 15.7 24.1 26.2 29.0
Net Railway Revenue (Loss) (7.2) ( 7.6) (6.3) (4.6) 5.9 4.6
Add: Other Revenue 1.7 2.7 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.8
Net Revenue (Loss) (5.5) ( 4.9) (5.9) (3.7) 7.2 6.4
Add: Government Subsidy 5.9 3.8
Net Income (Adjusted) 0.4 (1.1) (3.7) 7.2 6.4
Total Cash Revenue 6.3 6.2 3.3 7.2 19.2 19.5
Operating Ratio % 102 94 90 83 77 78
Rate of Return % - 1.1 2.1 3.8 5.9 5.8
6.16 Total forecast operating revenues show a sharp increase in the years
ahead due to rising traffic and to tariff increases detailed in Annex 8. As
also noted in Annex 8, operating expenses, particularly those associated
with the devaluation of the Won in December 1974, are expected to rise due
mainly to basic cost increases, with some provision made for a higher level
of maintenance and increases in line with the expected rise in traffic. The
Government subsidy in the years 1974-1975 is KNR's estimate of the amount
to be received from the Government as compensation against revenues foregone
due to not implementing a general rate increase in 1973.
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6.19 Forecast balance sheets for the years 1974-79, given in Table 13,
are summarized below:
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Billions of Won
Current Assets 11.8 16.4 20.3 23.7 27.3 30.8
Less: Current Liabilities 15.9 16.2 19.9 22.0 25.2 25.7
Net Working Capital (Deficiency) (4.3) 0.2 0.4 2.3 3.1 5.1
Net Fixed Assets 377.0 442.7 516.1 556.6 586.7 622.3
Other Assets 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0
Total Assets 397.8 467.9 541.5 582.3 613.7 652.4
Long-term Debt 162.3 203.0 245.5 267.0 280.0 299.5
Provision for Severance Pay 1.9 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.7 4.5
Short-term Finance from
Government 
- 31.2 67.7 90.1 100.6 112.6
Net Equity 233.6 231.8 225.9 222.2 229.4 235.8
Total Liabilities and Equity 397.8 467.9 541.5 582.3 613.7 652.4
6.18 Carrying out of the actions proposed in paras 6.10, 6.11, 6.14 and
6.21 should result in the net working capital deficits of recent years being
eliminated by 1975. This is of critical importance because, while the project
provides for much needed spare parts on a one time arrangement, from 1977,
KNR will need to generate sufficient funds internally to provide for its
increasing annual material requirements in addition to financing increased
receivables outstanding. Also the rate of increase in long term debt will
slow down with the provision of funds from Government and return to
profitability in 1978.
6.19 Table 16 gives ratios for the years 1969 through 1979, incorporating
the debt service and rate of return requirements. It shows that KNR should
approach the minimal debt service and rate of return requirements forecast
in the Fourth Railway Project by about 1977. Debt to equity ratios should
increase from 41:59 in 1974 to 56:44 in 1979.
F. Financing the Project and the Plan
6.20 A cash flow statement for the years 1969-1979 is given in Table 17
and is summarized below for (a) the Project period (1975-1976) and (b) the
five year period 1975-1979, reconciled to KNR's net working capital posi-
tion. It takes into account the improvement expected in KNR's operations
and cash generation, and the effect of the p.oposed tariff increases.
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Summarized Cashflow
(Reconciliated to Net Working Capital)
1 2
Project Five Year
Period Period
(1975-76) (1975-79)
Billions of Won
Source of Funds
Net Revenue 16.8 106.0
Depreciation 16.5 52.5
Total Generated by KNR 33.3 158.5
Borrowing 100.6 190.4
Funds from Goverrnment 67.7 112.6
Operating Subsidies 3.8 3.8
All Other Sources 0.5 2.6
Total Funds Available 205.9 467.9
Funds Required
Capital Expenditures 155.6 297.8
Repayment of Long-term Debt 16.8 52.6
Loan Interest Charges 27.6 106.9
Total Funds Required 200.0 457.3
Net Increase in Working Capital 5.9 10.6
Net Working Capital:
Beginning of Period (4.3) (4.3)
End of Period 1.6 6.3
6.21 The projections for the project period, given in Column I, illus-
trate KNR's present inability to generate sufficient capital from operations
and consequent heavy reliance on borrowing, together with the necessity for
the provision of Government funds. The five-year forecast summarized in
Column 2 projects a more favorable situation, with KNR's net working capital
returning to a more satisfactory position. The additional borrowing required
during 1975-1976 consists of the proposed Bank loan of $100 million (Won 48.5
billion equivalent); US Export-Import Bank, Won 23.5 billion equivalent for
diesel locomotives; European manufacturers consortium, Won 10.3 billion equiv-
alent for electric locomotives and ancillary equipment; Federal Republic of
Germany finance, Won 4.5 billion equivalent for signalling equipment; miscel-
laneous suppliers finance of about Won 1.7 billion equivalent, and the draw-
ing down of the remainder of Loans 863-KO, 669-KO, and Credit 183-KO (about
Won 12 billion). At negotiations agreement was reached that the Government
would provide the funds; (a) as needed to carry out the project and (b) as
required by KNR to service its debts, both existing at present and as entered
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into subsequently. It was also agreed that the proposed Bank loan to the
Government be passed on to KNR on the same terms, i.e. repayable over 25
years including 5 year grace period.
6.22 Investment taken into account during the years 1977-1979 is in line
with KNR's proposals, discussed briefly in para. 4.04. These are likely to
be modified after further study, and some reductions have tentatively been
made, particularly those for track improvements and capacity increases. It
is assumed that foreign exchange requirements will be covered by borrowing,
on similar terms to Bank loans, and that part of the local currency require-
ments will be provided by the Government.
G. The Seoul Metropolitan Electrified Suburban Railway System (SMESRS)
6.23 At the time of the Fourth Railway Loan, a subway system was being
built to serve the Seoul Metropolitan area. SMESRS is a separate entity
under the administration of the Seoul city government. Some KNR suburban
services will run over the Subway lines. Section 4.05 of Loan 863-KO pro-
vides that KNR shall charge fares on these services sufficient to cover at
least their variable costs and that the Government would reimburse KNR for
any uncovered portion of their full operating cost. Operations commenced
August 15, 1974.
H. Accounting, Budgets and Auditing
(i) Accounting and Budgets
6.24 The KNR still maintains its accounts and prepares its operating
forecasts and capital budgets on a cash basis budgetary accounting system,
and periodically adjusts such accounts to an accrual basis for financial
statement presentation. Thus the commercial accounting system financed
under Credit 25-KO is not in satisfactory operation. According to the
auditors the books have been set up correctly but lack adequate internal
controls, particularly for inventory purchases and issuances, and there
has been no physical inspection of inventories and agreement with book
records for many years.
6.25 The consultants presently assisting KNR in installing the com-
mercial accounting system are investigating whether this system can be
amended to provide financial information in the form required by the EPB,
Ministry of Finance and Bureau of Audit and Inspection. It was agreed at
negotiations that, KNR would, within 12 months of the date of the Loan
Agreement: (a) implement a time-phased program for the completion of the
installation of a commercial accounting system acceptable to the Bank and
(b) install a traffic costing system.
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(ii) Audlit
6.26 In accordance with loan requirements that KNR retain auditors satis-
factory to the Bank, international firms (latterly with local affiliation)
have been auditing KNR's commercial accounts since 1967. However, the
requirement that the Bank receive a copy of the audit report not later
than five months after the end of each fiscal year has not been complied
with - that for 1972 was not received until January 1974. The audit report
for 1973 has only recently been received due to the late closing of KNPR's
accounts. It was reaffirmed during negotiations that audited accounts
for 1974 and thereafter will be submitted to the Bank not later than five
montlhs after the end of the fiscal year, in accordance with the undertakings
in previous Loan Agreements.
VII. AGREEMENTS REACHED AND RECONIENDATIONS
7.01 During negotiations, agreement was reached on the following
principal points:
(a) the submission by KNR within three months of a firm plan
of action for maintenance normalization for diesel loco-
motives, passenger cars and freight cars, and rehabilitation
of diesel locomotives presently out of service (para. 3.15);
(b) the provision by the Government to KNR of adequate funds, in
local or foreign currency as required, on an annual basis,
to finance the purchase of spare parts (para. 3.15);
(c) the consultation with the Bank, after appropriate study
regarding the technical, financial and economic feasibility
of components of KNR's investment program for the period
1977-1979, before any commitments are made (para. 4.04);
(d) the increase in tariffs and other measures to improve
KNR's earnings and working capital (para. 6.14); and
(e) the provision of funds needed to carry out the project, and
as required by KNR to service all debt (para. 6.21).
7.02 A condition for loan effectiveness is the submission to the Bank
by the Government, of a time-phased program for the effective formulation
and review of policies and investment proposals by all its agencies and
ministries related to the transport sector, including inter alia, the
function, autlhority, work schedule and staffing of TPO (para. 2.05).
7.03 The project provides a suitable basis for a Bank loan of US$100
million. The proposed loan would be made to the Republic of Korea for a
term of 25 years, including a five-year period of grace and on-lent to
KNR on similar terms.
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SqmarY of the Bank Group Contribution in the Transport Sector
Amount
Year Project (US$ Million) Description
1. Credit 25 1962 Railway 14.0 The project was part of the 1962-1966 Korean Railroad Investment
Program and consisted of (i) the cDmpletion of the new line (16 km),
(ii) the procurement of rolling stDck (about 1,400 various cars) and
(iii) the establishment of a modern and sound accounting and statis-
tical system for the Railroad. The Bank promoted the autonomy of
the railroad agency. Project execution was satisfactory except for
implementation of the accounting and statistical system.
2. Grant 1965 Transportation 0.2 The Government appointed BCEOM and NEDECO to carry out an integrated
Survey transport survey to recommend a detailed transport investment plan
for 1967-1971.
3. Credit 110 1967 Railway 10.7 The project was the first three years of the 1967-1971 Korean Rail-
road Investment Program and consisted of (i) the procurement of
locomotives and rolling stock, (ii) the expansion of line capacity
through the renewal and improvement of various facilities and (iii)
the improvement of operative efficiency with the aid of consultants.
Execution of the project was satisfactory.
4. Preinvestment 1968 Highway Studies 3.5 The Bank financed the study on highway organization, transportation
Study S4 coordination, technical assistanco for implerenting highway reor-
ganization, highway feasibility of 1,160 km o_ roads and detailed
engineering of roads with high priority.
5. Loan 669/ 1970 Railway 55.0 The project, part of the 1967-1971 Korean Railroad Investment Pro-
Credit 183 gram, was to help finance diesel locomotives and freight cars and to
provide consultant services to study (i) improvement of maintenance
of diesel locomotives and railcars, (ii) the construction of a new
workshop and (iii) the telecommunication system. There was a prob-
lem in freight car procurement in 1971, and procurement of some
items has been very slow.
6. Loan 769 1971 Highway 54.5 The project consists of road construiction (3/2 km of national high-
way), feasibility studies of about 1,400 los and detailed engineering
of about 1,100 km of national highways, a highway maintenance study
and purchase of highway maintenance equipment. The execution of
the project is satisfactory.
7. Loan 863 1972 Railway 40.0 The project, part of the 1972-1976 Korean Railroad Investment Pro-
gram, was to help finance track msteri-als and equipment, bridge gir-
ders and erection equipment, 271 passenger coaches, 5 heavy break-
down cranes, and plant and machinery for workshops and running sheds.
8. Loan 917 1973 Ports 80.0 The project will provide: At Btusan - a compoEite pier with two
container berths and stacking area, a grain berth, eqiiipment for
handling containers and unloading grain; a bulk handling pier with
one coal import berth, two for ores and mineral exports and one for
steel imports; cranes and bulk handling systems; dredging of an
access channel; a new internationatl ferry berth and rehabilitation
of pier 1 for general cargo; coastal ferry berths with passenger
facilities; rehabilitation of pier 2 for general cargo. At Mug Ho-
new coal pier 3 with improvements to existing conveyor systems and
new mechanical loaders; a new belt/reclaimer system in the existing
open storage area; dredging at the new coal piers; raising the
existing breakwater and strengthening the side slopes; rehabilita-
tion of existing cement and general cargo berths.
9, Loan 956 1974 Highway 47.0 The project consists of (i) construction of 130 km of national high-
ways from Saemal to Gangreung and Gangreung to Mul 1o9,xii) paving of
634 km of national highways, (iii) feasibility studies by consultants
for improvement and paving of 1,000 km of roads, and detailed engin-
eering of those roads found to be justified and (iv) procurement of
highway maintenance and workshop equipment for the extension of a
new national highway maintenance organization from a pilot province
to tae remainder of the country.
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Government Agencies Concerned with Transportation
I. Ministries
1. The Ministry of Transportation (MOT) is responsible for railroad
and civil aviation infrastructure works. It controls transport operations
for all modes, issues regulations, delivers licenses, performs cost calcu-
lations, sets rates and fares, collects transport statistics and undertakes
research. It carries out its activities through four bureaus: Land Trans-
portation, Marine Transportation, Civil Aviation and Lourism; and exerts
control over KNR. In May 1973, the Busan-Mukho port unit in MOT was es-
tablished as an initial step to create an autonomous Korean Port Authority
by 1978.
2. The Ministry of Construction (MOC) is responsible for planning,
construction and maintenance of national highways and ports, except Busan
and Mukho. It controls the Korean Highway Corporation, created in
January 1969, which is in charge of constructing, maintaining and operating
toll roads. It is also responsible for policy on other roads.
3. The Economic Planning Board (EPB) reviews and makes final decisions
on the transport investment programs. The Deputy Prime Minister, who is
Chairman of EPB, is advised by the Economic Plan Committee (EPC). EPC is
chaired by the Deputy Minister of EPB and is composed of the Deputy Ministers
of major ministries and other specially appointed members. Within the EPC,
the Transportation and Communication Committee (further subdivided into two
subcommittees) is in charge of appraising projects submitted by the minis-
tries and agencies.
4. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry is responsible for farm
and forestry roads.
5. The Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI) is responsible for
promoting and supervising assembly plants for motor vehicles, railway
rolling stock and shipbuilding.
6. The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is responsible for establishing and
collecting taxes related to transportation.
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7. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) is the highest authority over
all local government; it is responsible for administration and execution of
work on roads other than national highways; and it administers various taxes,
such as the vehicle and the acquisition tax, to help finance transport works
by local authorities. MOHA is also in charge of the highway police.
II. Bodies for Transport Coordination
1. The Transportation Coordination Ministers Conference (TCMC) was
established in January 1970 in order to coordinate and discuss transport
plans and policies at the ministerial level. TCMC consists of the Minis-
ters of EPC, MOC, MOHA, MOF, National Defense, MOCI, MOT and the Minister
Without Portfolio, and is headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and the
Minister of EPB.
2. The Transportation Coordination Working Group (TCWG) was estab-
lished in September 1970 as an instrument of TCMC and is intended to provide
liaison and information from the ministries concerned at the working level.
3. The Transportation Planning Office (TPO) in MOT was organized in
December 1969 for appropriate coordination of the transport sector and is
designated as a permanent body to serve as secretariat of TCMC. MOC still
retains authority over planning for highways and ports.
March 1975
ANNEX 3
Page 1
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Development of Transport Sector: 1962-1973
A. Introduction
1. Historically the railways and, to a lesser extent, coastal ship-
ping have been the major modes of transportation in Korea. Both suffered
serious deterioration during the Second World War and heavy losses during
the Korean War. The railways were rehabilitated extensively under the
large US aid program of the 1950s, and port capacity was also restored,
but coastal shipping revived only in the 1960s, when rapid economic growth
created a large demand for transport capacity. The end of political in-
stability and the adoption of sound economic and financial policies after
1962 enabled Korea to achieve large increases in industrial production and
exports (the latter were minimal in 1962) during 1962-1973; during this
period, GNP increased by about 10% per annum. As part of this growth,
freight traffic in ton-km increased annually by an average of nearly 12%,
passenger traffic in pass-km by about 13% and international port traffic
by about 22%.
B. Freight Traffic
2. The development of commercial freight traffic during 1962-1973
is summarized in the following table (for details, see table 1):
Mode 1962 1973 1962 1973 1962 1973
(Million tons) (Billion ton-km) (Average Distance in km)
Railway 17.9 37.8 4.0 8.6 223 228
Road 16.9 72.0 0.4 3.1 24 43
Coastal 2.0 9.7 0.2 4.2 100 432
Total 36.8 119.5 4.6 15.9
Average 125 133
The railways continued to handle the bulk cf freight traffic (54% of the
total ton-km in 1973) but there was also a large expansion in road transport
and coastal shipping. The railways accounted for 41%, coastal shipping for
35%, and road transport for 24% of the total increase in ton-km during 1962-
1973 (30%, 40% and 30%, respecitvely during 1967-1973).
3. The continued preponderance of the railways in freight traffic
is explained in large part by location patterns, which make movement by
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rail the most economical means of transportation for a large proportion
of the total movement of commodities. Domestic natural resources, e.g.,
coal, iron ore and limestone, are located in the north, northeast and center
of the country and require heavy bulk transport to the industrial areas,
mainly located in and around Seoul-Inchon and Busan. Thus, about 76%
(based on 1973 data) of rail freight traffic consists of bulk commodities.
In 1973 anthracite alone accounted for 37% of total rail freight.
4. In addition to this locational factor, the heavy reliance on
railways for freight transport is due to the fact that the capacity of
the railways has been increased substantially, while improvements to the
road network started only a few years ago and the expansion of the road
vehicle fleet has been small. The average length of haul of road transport,
24 km in 1962 and 43 km in 1973, indicates that trucking services are
mainly for short hauls within urban areas and between urban areas and ad-
jacent rural areas and act as feeder services for the railways and ports.
Long distance trucking services have started only recently. Percentage
wise, the increase in the number of trucks was very large (from 13,000
trucks in 1962 to 65,000 trucks in 1973) but the absolute number is small
for Korea's level of economic development. The small number of vehicles
reflects (i) a low capacity of the road network, (ii) restrictions of the
importation of vehicles, (iii) slow expansion of domestic car production
capacity and (iv) a restrictive licensing policy.
5. The expansion of the highway network during 1962-1969 was unusually
small compared with developments in other countries. In line with the rec-
ommendations of a 1965 Bank-financed Transport Survey and of Bank economic
missions, the Government has greatly increased the allocations for highway
construction since 1968. However, although the Survey recommended a pro-
gram of paving existing roads and improving highway maintenance, a large
part of these funds was allocated to the construction of four toll ex-
pressways (Seoul-Busan, 428 km; Seoul-Incheon, 29.5 km; Daejon-Jeonju, 79 km;
and Suwon-Saemal, 104 km), of which the Seoul-Busan was economically pre-
mature in many sections. This resulted in (i) a shortage of funds for
maintenance and improvement of the existing roads and (ii) a diversion of
passenger traffic from the railways, particularly in 1970 and 1971. There
was recently a major policy change in the Government and the emphasis on
high standards of road construction was shifted to paving and appropriate
construction standards for the traffic levels to be served. Also, the
Government is beginning to recognize the importance of road maintenance.
Currently, road density is generally sufficient, but the condition of most
of the road network is inadequate. Only 15% of roads are paved (33% of the
national and 2% of- the provincial highways). Furthermore, the unpaved roads
are in a poor state.
6. The cost: of vehicles is high as a result of the Government's policy
of prohibiting the import of all assembled vehicles (except of a small number,
in special categories) and requiring the use of an increasing proportion of
domestically manufactured components in locally assembled vehicles.
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7. The MOT through the Bureau of Land Transportation is responsible
for licensing and regulation of highway transport. Licensing of the road
transport industry has been restrictive and regulations include (i) issuing
licenses only to enterprises having a minimum of 20 vehicles in cities or
10 vehicles in country districts, (ii) imposing quotas on the total number
of vehicles in each province, (iii) limiting the use of vehicles to specific
areas or routes and (iv) regulation of rates for freight, as well as pas-
senger traffic. The Government recently reviewed its policies concerning
the regulation of road transport and in a Policy Statement dated October 5,
1973 indicated an intention to relax present restrictions; during negotia-
tions for the Second Highway Project, the Government agreed to relax them
by June 30, 1975.
8. Coastal shipping carried 9.7 million tons and 4.2 billion ton-km
or cargoes consisting mainly of oil, coal and cement. Oil is by far the
most important commodity, some of which originates at, and is handled by,
specific ports.
C. Passenger Traffic
9. The development of commercial passenger traffic during 1962-1973
is summarized in the following table (for details, see Table 1):
Mode 1962 1973 1962 1973
(Passengers (millions) Pass-Km (billions)
Railway 100.6 143.0 5.9 10.7
Road 667.1 3,855.8 5.5 32.1
Coastal 4.4 7.2 0.2 0.4
Air 
_ 1.3 - 0.4
Total 772.1 4,007.3 11.6 43.6
The railways still continue to handle substantial passenger traffic (24%
of the total pass-km in 1973) but there was a large increase in road
transport. Available data on road passenger traffic from 1969 to 1973 in-
dicates that a large part of the passenger traffic was carried by intra-
city and inter-city buses. The table below summarizes the characteristics
of passenger traffic on the roads in 1973:
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Number Average Number
of Distance of
Passengers Pass-Km Traveled Vehicles
(million) (billion) (km)
Expressway bus 37.3 5.7 15 725
Inter-city bus 443.9 12.0 27 6,900
Intra-city bus 2,428.6 10.7 4 7,907
Micro-bus 2.6 -
Taxi 930.1 3.1 3 29,647
3,842.5 31.5 8 45,179
Inter-city buses aLre operated on about 4,000 routes of which about 2,400
have less than 50 km route-km and only about 100 operate at longer than
200 route km. Out: of 7,907 intra-city buses, about 4,500 are registered
in Seoul; about 1,300 in Busan. Except for expressway bus services, road
passenger traffic generally does not compete with railway services.
10. The evolution to a multi-mode transport system started in passenger
traffic in 1969; this meant long and intermediate distance rail vis-a-vis
expressway bus competition. The use of expressway buses followed the
completion of expressways:
Number Number of
of Bus Buses
Sections Distance Date of Completion Routes Operating
(km)
Seoul - Inchon 295 December 1968 1 31
Seoul - Busan 428 July 1970 24 443
Dae Jeon - Jeon Ju 79 December 1970 10 178
Su Weon - Saemal 104 October 1971 5 38
Jeon Ju - Sun Cheon 189 November 1973 n/a n/a
Busan - Sun Cheon 177 November 1973 6 60
While the number of railway passengers, particularly on the Seoul - Busan
sections, decreased considerably in 1970 and 1971, the total expressway
bus passenger traffic increased from 1.9 billion pass-km in 1970 to 5.6
billion pass-km in 1973.
11. The major factors which affect the relative use of expressway
buses and rail paLssenger services seem to be the fares charged, the fre-
quency of services, and the degree of comfort offered to the passengers.
KNR ran no less than 22 passenger trains a day each way between Seoul and
Busan in 1973 (for parts of this line the number is much greater) and 14
of these, three super express trains and eleven limited express trains, are
as fast as the expressway buses. The expressway buses, however, are more
frequent, and the fares charged currently by buses are similar to those
of the limited express train even though buses offer airconditioned
accommodations.
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Description of Railway Property
A. Railway Lines
1. At the end of 1973, KNR operated 3,086 route-km of standard gauge
(1,435 mm) and 47 km of narrow gauge (760 mm) lines, mainly single track;
529 km are double track (see Map). The double track main lines have
gradients not exceeding 1% and curves of 400 m minimum radius. There are
many sections in mountainous areas; over 40% of the network has gradient
over 1% with some sections of 2.5% and 3%. There are numerous curves,
140 km of tunnels and 97 km of bridges. Several of the bridges need
strengthening, which is being executed under the Fourth Loan. KNR plans
to continue the bridge strengthening.
2. The total length of track, excluding about 1,441 km of siding, is
4,100 km mainly laid with 50 kg/m and 37 kg/m rails. All renewal of princi-
pal lines is now with 50 kg/m rails. Some 90 km of track on the Seoul-
Busan line have welded rails and 47% of the track has pre-stressed concrete
sleepers. Most of the track is laid with 22 cm of ballast with shingle
collected from river beds. The ballast is not clean and contains about
30% of soil. With the growth of traffic, KNR has carried out in the past,
rail reniewals on a programmed basis and adopted mechanized track maintenance.
During 1976, KNR plans to carry out complete renewal of 80 km of track,
after acquiring mechanized track renewal equipment.
3. Signalling arrangements consist of color lights in the Seoul area
and electric block instruments on most main lines. Centralized Traffic
Control (CTC) was installed on the single line of heaviest traffic between
Mang U (near Seoul) and Je Cheon (155 km). Automatic block signalling
installed between Seoul and Dae Jeon on the Seoul Busan line will be
extended to Busan (about 180 km). Automatic train stopping system for
safety has already been introduced and will be further extended. About
30% of the 349 km single track railway iines connecting the northern motn-
tainous region with Seoul (industrial lines) has already been electrified;
thie remaining 70.5 km are expected to be electrified by June 1975.
3. Motive Power and Rolling Stock
4. KNR's motive power and rolling stock position at the end of 1973
is given in the table at the end of this Aninex. The fleet consisted of 433
iocomotives (60 steam, 336 diesel and 37 electric), 133 diesel railcars,
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1,577 passenger cars, and 16,269 freight cars. During 1974 KNR acquired 29
additional electric locomotives (making a total of 66 electric locomotives)
for operation on the electrified industrial lines and 126 electric railcars
for operation in the Seoul suburban electrified area.
5. The high percentage of availability of diesel locomotives indicated
by KNR, (89%), and of passenger cars (87%) has been achieved by deferring
scheduled systematic maintenance. Inadequate maintenance of locomotives
has resulted in frequent locomotive failures on the run (about five daily).
The availabilit) of freight cars has deteriorated from 89% in 1971 to 87%
in 1973. Consultants (Touche Ross & Co., Canada), who made studies financed
under the Third Loan, recommended improvements in the maintenance operation
for running stock but they have not yet been carried out because of lack
of spare parts and repair facilities. With the rapid traffic growth, KNR
has been forced to fully utilize its running stock intensively at the
sacrifice of regular maintenance. KNR is aware of this serious situation
and has planned the re-engining of 52 diesel locomotives (General Motors),
and the acquisition of spare parts for two years, 1975 and 1976 and of about
200 wheelsets for passenger cars and about 2,000 wheelsets for freight cars.
6. A coherent plan of action for maintenance normalization for loco-
motives and rolling stock should be prepared and implemented by KNR with the
assistance of a technical adviser and also a schedule of rehabilitation of
diesel locomotilves is necessary. Suggested terms of reference for such a
plan of action (which will also take into account the recommendation of
Touche Ross regarding maintenance of diesel locomotives) is given in
Annex 5. To meet the traffic growth, KNR plans to acquire a further 50 diesel
locomotives (financed by a U.S. Export-Import Bank loan) and 24 electric
locomotives (from a consortium of European manufacturers). While the intro-
duction of these diesel locomotives would have made it possible to replace
some of the existing steam locomotives, replacement of steam locomotives
with diesel locomotives previously planned for 1974 will not be done until
arrears of maintenance is overtaken. Therefore, some 16 diesel locomotives
will be used as reserve for faster withdrawal of existing diesel locomotives
from service for carrying out deferred maintenance.
7. To improve the low availability of diesel railcars (60% in 1974)
the re-engining of 90 railcars is underway and financed on loan terms by
the Government (Korean Foreign Exchange); of the 90 re-enginings, 70 are
expected to be completed in 1975. KNR expects to increase the availability
of railcars to about 85% by end-1976.
8. About 340 passenger cars are in poor condition, out of which about
100 would be scrapped during 1975-76. KNR plans to acquire a further 150
ordinary passenger cars during 1975-76. The tare weight to be adopted in
the future for ordinary passenger cars was discussed with KNR engineers
during the mission. In view of the merit of passenger cars of light weight
design, the 150 ordinary passenger cars to be acquired during 1975-76 will
have a tare weight of not more than 30 tons each.
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9. About 1,400 freight cars are in poor condition. In 1974 KNR
acquired 500 gondola freight cars financed by the Government. In addition,
during 1975-76 KNR plans to acquire 400 box cars, 500 gondola cars and 600
hopper cars and to receive 387 privately owned tank cars. About 218
freight cars would be scrapped during that period.
10. KNR plans to improve its heating car fleet for heating passenger
trains. The improvement during 1975-76 consists of: (i) the conversion of
25 passenger cars into heating cars by installing steam generators and diesel
powered blowers; and (ii) the replacement of old oil burners in 13 existing
heating cars with equipment as in (i).
C. Telecommunications
11. Much of KNR's telecommunications network has reached the end of
its expected life. Under the Third Loan, KNR planned to install a micro-
wave system between Busan and Seoul. The bid for microwave equipment was
opened in March 1974 but the bid evaluation was not in accordance with
Bank guidelines. New bids are now under scrutiny.
D. Double Tracking
12. The double tracking of the Ho Nam line (88.6 km) has been partially
completed (25.4 km) and a further 21 km is expected to be completed by 1974.
KNR's recent passenger and freight traffic forecast on this line indicates
that the double tracking would be necessary for the remaining 42.7 km of
which 21 km have now been planned. The national policy regarding greater
utilization of coal as source of energy and the consequent increase of
rail transport of coal has prompted the partial double tracking between
Ye Mi and Jo Dong (6.3 km) on the Tae Baeg line, which is planned for 1975.
E. Marshalling Facilities
13. Marshalling facilities in yards and stations are generally in-
adequate in relation to the expanding traffic and for increased block train
operations. Further improvements are planned.
F. Workshops
14. KNR has four main workshops at Seoul (electric locomotive, pas-
senger cars, freight cars and electric and diesel railcars) Yeong Deung Po
(steam locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars) Busan (diesel locomotive,
passenger cars and freight cars) and Incheon (passenger cars and freight cars).
According to earlier plans the work in these workshops was to be rationalized
and a new workshop at Dae Jeon for freight car repairs was to be constructed.
In the latest proposals, the location of the new freight car workshop has
been changed to Hae Dok. The old plant and machinery in the existing work-
shops will be modernized and augmented. Out of the 17 diesel locomotive
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repair sheds, seven will be retained with added equipment like portal cranes
for lifting locomotives. However, the need for seven diesel locomotive re-
pair sheds and rat:Lonalization of work between major running sheds and repair
workshops will be further examined as part of the plan of action for
satisfactory maintenance of motive power. Generally, the standard of repair
work done in the workshops and running sheds is poor and needs great
improvement.
G. Other Property
15. In general, the buildings, stations, offices and general plant
of the railways are well maintained. However, some improvements are needed
in certain station and yards; these are now planned.
ANINEX 4
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Composition of Motive Power and Rolling Stock as of
December 31, 1973, with 1974, 1975 and 1976 Forecast
Increase (+) or
Actual Forecast Decrease (-)
1973 1974 197 1976 during 1975-76
1. Motive Power
Steam Locomotives 60- 60 60 60 0
Diesel-Mainline
Locomotives 301 301 341 351 +50
Diesel-Shunting
Locomotives 35 35 35 35 0
Diesel Railcars 133 133 133 133 0
Electric Locomotives 37 V 66 66 76 +10
Electric Railcars - 126 126 126 0
Sub-Total 566 721 761 781 f6o
2. Passenger Car Stock
Passenger Cars 1,577 1,725 1,798 1,833 +108
Heating Cars 141 141 151 166 + 25
3. Freight Car Stock
Box Cars 5,333 5,253 5,343 5,443 +190
Gondola/Hopper Cars 6,670 6,880 7,420 7,980 + 1,100
Tank Cars 2,253 2,276 2,451 2,633 +357 .
Flat Cars 1,440 1,402 1,360 1,315 -87
Container Cars 100 118 152 187 +69
Other 43 498 523 538 +40
Sub-Total 16,269 16,427 17,249 18,096 + 1,669
1/ Excluding 33 steam locomotives stored in either workshops or running sheds.
2/ In addition, KNR had 20 electric locomotives under test runs as of ead-1973.
3/ Comprising the purchase of 387 privately owned cars followed by scrapping of 30
during 1975 and 1976.
Source: KNIR and mission estimates
March 197k
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Suggested Terms of Reference of a Plan of Action for
Maintenance Normalization for Diesel Locomotives,
Passenger Cars and Freight Cars
1. Objective
The objective of the Plan of Action is to restore the maintenance
of locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars to generally accepted
standards and thus improve their availability according to targets
laid down below. The early rehabilitation of cannibalized diesel
locomotives will also be part of the Plan of Action. A technical
adviser will assist in the implementation of the Plan of Action.
2. Target for Restoration of Maintenance
To achieve this objective, the target date shall be December 31, 1977.
3. Target Indicators to be Achieved by December 31, 1977
The targets to be achieved are:
Ratio of Planned
Scheduled Maintenance
Type of 'tock to Actual Availability
(M)
Diesel Locomotives 1.00 85
Passenger Cars 1.00 90
Freight Cars 1.00 93
4. Normal Maintenance
The planned schedule of normal maintenance for diesel locomotives
will include, all the schedules for inspection recommended by manu-
facturers. For passenger cars and freight cars the planned schedules
will include all periodical inspections specified by the Railway
Administration.
5. Availability
In working out the percentage of availability of locomotives, all
time spent on. repairs and maintenance in shops and running sheds shall
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be taken into account as under or awaiting repair. Similarly, for
passenger cars and freight cars, time spent in workshops on repairs
and maintenance and in inspection and maintenance in maintenance depots
will be counted as under or awaiting repairs.
6. Reserve of Diesel Locomotives
A reserve of 16 diesel locomotives will be kept to enable KNR
to achieve the planned schedule of maintenance and availability of
diesel locomotives. The reserve will be built up as follows:
(a) out of the 40 diesel locomotives to be delivered in 1975,
12 locomotives will be designated as reserve and not included
in the working units;
(b) out of the 10 diesel locomotives to be delivered in 1976,
4 will be designated as reserve and not included in working
units.
7. Adequate Funds
For the two years commencing October 1975, and ending September 1977,
the following funds in local and foreign currency will be made available
by the Government to KNR to finance the purchase of urgently required
spare parts:
(a) Diesel Locomotives - not less than Won 4.4 billion
(US$9 million);
(b) Passenger Cars - not less than Won 2.0 billion
(US$4.0 million);
(c) Freight Cars - not less than Won 3.0 billion
(US$6.0 million).
For the subsequent years the funds to be made available to KNR for the
same purpose on an annual basis will be as follows:
(a) Diesel Locomotives - not less than Won 2.2 billion
(US$4.5 million);
(b) Passenger Cars - not less than Won 1.0 billion
(US$2.0 million);
(c) Freight Cars - not less than Won 1.5 billion
(US$3.0 million).
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Description of the 1975-76 Plan and the Project - Main Items
The Investment Plan to be implemented during the period 1975-76
is estimated to require an expenditure of about Won 156 billion, including
contingencies. The Project consists of that part of KNR's Investment Plan
1975-76, for which Bank financing is not provided under the Third and Fourth
Railwavs Loans, and is estimated to require the expenditure of about Won 141
billion, includi-ng contingencies. The main components of the Investment
Plan and the present Project are:
Part A: New Line Construction (The whole of this item forms part of the
Project)
Completion of the construction of coal sidings (Gio Han area
about 5 km) and industrial sidings (Suncheon area about 3 km).
Part B: Electrification (The whole of this item forms part of the Project)
(a) Completion of the electrification of about 71 km (Gio Han to
Bug Pylong);
(b) Completion of the Seoul suburban area electrification.
Part C: Increase in Station and Line Capacity (The whole of this item
forms part of the Project)
(a) Installation of signalling, including the Centralized
Traffic Control (CTC) system in the Seoul area, automatic
block signalling betwqeen Dae Jeon and Busan (about 180 km),
automatic train stopping system, station signalling
improvement (about 15 stations) and railroad level crossing
improvement (about 25 places);
(b) Continuation of the work on the double tracking of the
Ho Narn Line (about 21 kmi) and completion of the work
on the partial double tracking of the Tae Baeg Line
(about 6 km);
(c) Completion of the construction of the llae Dok (about
500 cars daily), Je Cheon (about 580 cars daily) and
Bu Gok (about 600 cars daily) marshalling yards;
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(d) Completion of the extension of station yards (7 yards);
(e) Construction of station buildings (3 major stations
and others);
(f) Construction of bypass lines (about 2 junctions);
(g) Construction of crossing loops (about 15 stations);
(h) Lengthening of crossing loops (about 10 stations).
Part D: Way and Structure Renewals and Improvements (The whole item ex-
cluding parts of Items (a) and (g), forms part of the Project.)
(a) Rail renewal (about 286 km), of which only 156 km forms
part of the project;
(b) Complete track renewal (about 80 km);
(c) Point and crossing improvement (about 390 sets);
(d) The provision of pre-stressed concrete sleepers
(about 152,000);
(e) The provision and placing at site of ballast
(about 500,000 cu m);
(f) The provision and placing in service of track
maintenance equipment and the provision of spare
parts for track maintenance equipment purchased
under Credit 183/Loan 669-KO and Loan 863-KO;
(g) Renewal of bridges (about 8,346 tons of which only
5,900 tons form part of the Project.
Part E: Motive Power and Rolling Stock (The whole item except part of
Item (c) as indicated, forms part of the Project.)
(a) The provision and placing in service of 50 diesel
locomotives, the re-powering of about 52 diesel
locomotives, and the provision of spare parts for
diesel locomotives;
(b) The provision and placing in ser';ice of 10 electric
locomotives 1/ and the provision of spare parts for
electric locomotives;
1J Y i.as placed an order for 24 Electric- Locomotives before obtaining
the approvai of the Bank as required by Section 3.09 of Loan 863-KO.
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(c) The provision and placing in service of 228 ordinary
passenger cars and 19 special passenger cars and the
provision of about 200 wheelsets for passenger cars,
of which only 150 passenger cars and 200 wheelsets for
passenger cars form part of the Project;
(d) The provision and placing in service of 400 box cars,
1,600 gondola cars 1/, and the provision of about
2,000 wheelsets for freight cars;
(e) The rebuilding of about 25 heating cars and the
replacement of heating equipment of about 13 heating
cars;
(f) The rebuilding of about 50 container cars and about
200 cabooses and re-engining of about 20 diesel rail cars.
Part F: Motive Fower and Rolling Stock Repair Facilities (This item forms
part of the Project except for modernization of workshops at Seoul,
Busan, Incheon and modernization of freight car workshop at Je Cheon
and Ka Ya (Busan).
(a) Modernization of existing running sheds at Dae Jeon,
Je Cheon and Ka Ya (Busan) and of the existing workshops
at Seoul, Busan and Incheon;
(b) Modernization of the freight car workshops at Je Cheon
and Ka Ya (Busan), and construction of the freight car
workshop at Hae Dok.
Part G: Miscellaneous (This item, except for (d), parts of (a), and of (e),
forms part of the Project as indicated:)
(a) The provision and installation of microwave equipment
between Seoul and Busan, and the extension of train
radio system, of which only the extension of train radio
system forms part of the Project;
(b) Modernization of electric lighting facilities at
passenger stations;
(c) The provision of the services of a technical adviser
for normalization of maintenance for diesel locomotives,
passenger cars and freight cars;
(d) The provision of consultants' services for accounting
modernization and telecommunications and inventory control.
This item does not form part of the Project;
1/ Out of 1,600 gondola freight cars 500 cars were financed by the Govern-
ment and brought into use in 1974; payment for these cars is included
in the Project.
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(e) The provision of training for the KNR staff in
accounting, the use of track maintenance equipment
and microwave equipment and of plant and machinery
for workshops and running sheds, and maintenance of
diesel locomotives, passenger cars and freight cars.
The training in accounting and in the use of micro-
wave equipment do not form part of the Project;
(f) As part of the Plan of Action for normalization of
maintenance KNR will submit to the Bank, for its
review, a training program, including number,
categories and levels of personnel to be trained,
approach to training and resources required for its
implementation.
The Project is expected to be completed by June 30, 1977.
March 1975
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
1. This Annex analyzes KNR's Investment Plan for 1975-1976 in two
parts. The first concerns the increased role of KNR as a part of the
national policy to substitute coal for oil. The second concerns the
economic analysis of investment items other than coal-related investments.
B. Role of KNR and the Oil Price Increases
Energy Consumption
2. The total energy consumption in Korea in 1973 is estimated at the
equivalent of 50 million tons of coal. Of this total, the transport sector
consumed about 25% of the country's petroleum products and about 13% of the
total energy consumption in the country.
3. Petroleum products provide about 53% of the total energy sources
and they require crude oil imports of about 110 million barrels annually
at a cost of US$330 million (based on 1973 c.i.f. prices). In 1974, the total
cost of oil imports would amount to US$1,100 million, about four times higher
than in 1973, due mainly to the increase in the c.i.f. price of oil to
US$10.20 per barrel. The current account deficit for the country in 1974
is expected to be about US$1.2 billion, the bulk of which is attributable
to the increase in crude oil prices. Under these circumstances, Korea has
decided to make every effort to save foreign exchange expenditures by re-
ducing crude oil imports.
Energy PlaI
4. Following the increase in oil prices, the Government took wide-
ranging conservation measures including allocation arrangements for certain
uses. Domestic prices of petroleum products were raised markedly in stages
from late 1973; the Government is encouraging coal production and consump-
tion through subsidies and improvements in marketing systems. In early
1974, the Government adjusted its original energy plan for the Third Five-
Year Plan period (1972-1976). The revised energy plan calls for more coal
production and consumption in industry and households than originally estimated,
and less petroleum products production and consumption than initially expected:
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1974 (%) 1976 (%)
Original Revised Original Revised
Coal 25.9 29.6 24.3 29.1
Petroleum Products 60.7 56.1 64.5 59.1
Hydroelectric 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.9
Others 11.9 12.9 9.4 9.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
This means that coal consumption in 1976 would now be estimated at 19 million
tons as against 15.9 million, and that of petroleum products consumption at
about 39 million tons (coal equivalent) as against 42 million.
Economic Return Calculations
5. In order to increase coal production and to improve the distribu-
tion system, substantial investments are required as the present capacity
of mining, storage facilities, and KNR is fully utilized. The Government
envisages a total investment of about US$180 million, with a foreign ex-
change component of about US$95 million for 1975 and 1976. Of this KNR
investments would amount to US$99 million, with a foreign exchange com-
ponent of US$58 million. KNR's investments include only items related to
coal transportation, such as gondola cars, some diesel and electric loco-
motives, bridge and track strengthening, capacity increase in station yards,
and rail renewals.
6. Economic savings would be generated from a decline in crude oil
imports due to substitution of coal for petroleum products as energy sources.
Incremental increases in coal consumption over and above the original esti-
mates would be 2.6 million tons in 1975 and 3 million tons in 1976. Based
on 1973 data that 110 million barrels of crude oil imports produced petro-
leum products of the equivalent of 26.7 million tons of coal, and assuming
that the petroleum product mix in 1973 remains constant for the future
increases in coal production would substitute 10.7 million barrels of oil
4n 1975 and 12 million barrels of oil in 1976 and thereafter. These are
equivalent to savings of US$109 and $126 million, respectively, based on
the c.i.f. price of crude oil of US$10.20 per barrel in 1974.
7. Based on the investment costs including RNR's, of about US$179
million, savings in crude oil of US$109 million in 1975 and US$126 million
in 1976, and additional production costs of coal amounting to US$31 million
in 1975 and US$38 million in 1976, the investments would bring substantial
economic benefits to the country. Each ton of coal would substitute for
about 4.1 barrels of oil, thus resulting in a benefit cost ratio of about
3.3 and a first year return on the investment of over 50%.
C. Other Investment Items
8. The table at the end of this Annex quantifies the economic return
on the other investment items. They cover the purchase of freight car and
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passenger coaches, and motive power, track renewals and bridge strengthening,
track maintenance equipment, signalling, improvement of workshops and sheds,
and some yard and line capacity increases. Economic benefits in the form
of transport cost savings would be generated by improving KNR's operating
efficiency, and increasing KNR's capacity, thereby avoiding diversion of
traffic to otlher modes, particularly road transport, at higher costs.
9. The major variables involved in calculating the economic benefits
are (a) cost savings in railway operation by the execution of the Plan,
(b) the economic cost of road transport, and (c) the volume of traffic
which would have to be diverted from the railways because of present
capacity limitations. Coal-related costs and traffic discussed in the
preceding section are excluded from the analysis. Increases in railway
operating cost (in real terms) are estimated at about 0.5% per year.
10. Economic costs of alternative transport, i.e., road transport, are
based on 1973 data prepared by BCEOM in conjunction with "Highway Maintenance
Study," and adjusted to 1975 prices, taking into account the new gasoline
and diesel prices and other factors. Economic operating costs of trucks
and buses are:
Truck (6 ton) Bus
(vehicle-km) (vehicle-km)
1973 1975 1973 1975
Won 81.08 Won 117.75 Won 95.04 Won 120.27
Mtajor factors for increases in operating costs are increases in fuel and
engine oil and tire costs. Following the oil crisis domestic prices of
petroleum product- were raised in stages by 73% up to 80% from late 1973,
tire cost went uD substantially.
11. Considering the load factor and the efficiency of road transport
industries and the quality of the roads, the economic analysis applies very
conservative vehicle operating costs: Won 12.00 ton-km of trucks and
Won 3.60 per pass-km for buses.
12. Based on the investments amounting to about Won 73 billion in
real terms, or US$183 million, the economic benefits in the form of trans-
port cost savings would yield an economic rate of return of about 29%. The
estimated economic: rate of return would vary, depending upon alternative
assumptions for major variables in the analysis. Assuming that the cost
of the investment would be higher by 20% and, at the same time, railway
operating cost per traffic unit would be higher by 5%, in real terms, the
economic return would be about 21%.
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Eoamonic Return Calculatious for Other Items
(Unit: Won million)
Tranwport C08t Savings (2)
rassenger Uosts A) J Freight Costs PT)
(Pass-km) (Unit Cost) Cost (Tom-km) (Unit Cost) Cost Sub-Total Net Benefits
Year Capital Cost (l) in million x in Won Savings in million x in Won _ Savings (A_+(B)+(C) (2) - (l)
1975 31,736 508 3.60 1,827 482 12.00 5,789 7,616 -24,120
1976 41,505 1,355 3.60 1,880 960 12.00 11,520 16,403 -25,105
1977 - 1,355 3.60 1,880 960 12.00 11,520 16,403 16,400
1978-2001 - 1,355 3.60 1,880 960 12.00 11,520 16,403 16,400
Ecomoic Return 29.2
* Excludes effects of devaluatiom of the Won in December 1974
* March 1975
ANNEX 8
Page 1
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Financial Forecasts - Principal Assumptions
General
1. All suggested rate increases used in this appraisal should be
considered as a mLnimum. It is further assumed, although not taken into
account in the projections, that if:
(a) inflation, worldwide or domestic, exceeds 10% per year;
(b) additional investment programs are placed into effect
during the 1975-79 period over and above the current
project (1975-76) and that proposed by KNR in the years
1977-79; and
(c) there are any unforeseen cost overruns associated with
the proposed project.
then the Korean Government would permit additional tariff increases over
and above those indicated below and would provide additional funds over
and above the Wort 112 billion currently forecasted as being required over
the period 1975-1979.
Traffic
2. Traffic: will increase as forecast in Tables 5 and 7.
Revenues 1
3. The Government shall permit KNR to raise its tariffs by no less
than the following percentages over the following years:
Passenger Freight
1975 10% 10%
1976 10% 15%
1977 10% 20%
1978 10% 10%
1979 - 5%
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Operating Expenses
4. Personnel numbers as forecast by KNR. Wage levels increased as
forecast by KNR, by 30% in 1975, followed by annual increases of 12-15%.
5. The forecasts include KNR's fuel cost estimate which was based
on a reasonable engine kilometer projection by type of power, in relation
to anticipated traffic increase, together with the increases of December 1974
in fuel oil and electricity prices plus a 5% annual increase in fuel cost.
6. The level of cost of spares and other materials was increased
annually by 10% over the years 1976-79, with further annual increases in line
with traffic increases.
7. General and Administrative Expenses were estimated at about 15%
of total cash operating expenses over the five-year period in line with
previous experience.
8. Annual depreciation was calculated at 2.5% of KNR's net depreciable
assets, i.e., the value of gross fixed assets (including track) less the value
of land, at cost, in line with previous experience.
9. Interest charges were forecast on the basis of existing loans
plus estimated rates for new foreign borrowing.
Balance Sheet
10. Receivables apply only to freight services whereas passenger
service is currently on a cash basis. As such, receivables were forecast
on a 60-day basis or 17% of total freight revenues.
11. Inventories were forecast at about 13-14% of total operating costs.
12. Accounts payable were forecast on a basis of 60 days of total cash
expenses.
13. The Government will provide cash as follows:
1975 - Won 31.2 billion
1976 - Won 36.5 billion
1977 - Won 22.4 billion
1978 - Won 10.5 billion
1979 - Won 12.0 billion
TOTAL - Won 112.6 billion
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The forecasts also assume Government's granting of a cash subsidy to KNR
of Won 3.8 billion in 1975 as explained in para 6.16.
Debt service will be assumed by the Government until KNR's earnings are
sufficient to resume this burden.
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Traffic Data: 1962. 1965-1973
I. DOFESTIC TRAFFIC BY MODE 1962 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
1. Freight (i'illion tons)
Railway 17.9 22.4 24.1 27.4 28.9 3C.6 31.6 32.0 31.5 37.8
Highway 16.9 24.0 24.5 28.6 46.1 56.6 61.8 73.9 58.7 72.0
Coastal 2.0 2.7 2.7 4.2 5.6 8.1 10.5 11.3 8.8 9.7
Total 36.8 49.1 51-3 60.2 80.6 95.3 103.8 117.2 99.0 119.5
2. Freight (Billion ton-km)I
Railway 4.0 5.0 5.5 6.2 6.9 7.3 7.7 7.8 7.2 8.6
Highway 0.4 C.5 o.6 0.7 1.1 1.3 1.4 3.3 2.5 3.1
Coastal Shipping 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.4 2.1 4.2 4.7 3.9 4.2
Total 4.6 5.8 6.7 7.9 9.3 10.7 13.4 15.8 13.6 15.9
3. Passenger (Million pass)
Railway 100.6 107.2 138.3 152.0 151.0 154.7 131.0 128.2 137.1 143,0
Highway 667.1 1,195.5 1,511.6 1,674.8 2,018.9 2,418.6 2,743.8 3,024.2 3,308.5 3,855.8
Coastal Shipping 4.4 5.5 5.9 6.7 6.5 6.1 5.9 6.4 6.3 7.2
Air Transport - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 o.6 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.3
Total 772.0 1,308.04 1,656.0 1,833.7 2,176.7 2,580.0 2,881.5 3,159.9 3,453,0 4,007.3
4. Passenger (Billion pass-km)
Railway 5.9 6.9 8.7 9.6 10.6 11.1 9.7 8.8 10.1 10.7
Highway 5.5 8.o 11.5 11.7 13.9 16.7 20.0 22.9 26.3 32.1
Coastal Shipping 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Air Transport - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4
Total 11.5. 15.1 20.4 21.5 24.8 28.2 30.3 32.2 36.9 43,7
IT. OTHER TRAFFIC
1. Port (Million tons)
Exports o.8 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.6 4.2 6.o 8.0
Inports 3.7 5.2 6.8 9.7 13.5 17.1 18.7 24.3 24.7 31.9
Coastal Shipping 3.1 14.6 4.6 8.3 11.2 16.2 21.0 22.5 17.6 17.9
Total 7.5 11.3 13.0 19.9 27.0 36.2 43-3 51.0 48.3 57.8
of which Inchon (%) 17.3 12.2 14.7 14.8 15.2 15.1 18.5 18.0 19.7 21.0
Pusan (%) 43.4 38.5 40.4 32.0 26.1 22.2 21.3 21.4 24.0 23.0
2. Air ('000 passengers)
International - In 18 37 65 87 112 133 191 241 372 666
- Out 20 40 66 88 116 135 201 267 400 703
Domestic 48 207 192 215 312 627 909 1,105 1,121 1,269
Total 86 284 323 390 540 825 1,301 1,613 1,893 2,638
Source: Ministry of Transportation
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Transport Infrastructure. Rolling Stock aand Equipment
1962 1 1976 1971 1972 1973
EQADS
1. Road Network
N%ti.onal H-liaiways ( km)
Paved 857 1,042 1,442 1,957 2,461 2,943 3,319 3,868
Gravel 4,819 4,949 6,651 6,407 6,158 5,818 5395 5,400
fnrrepaired 66 8 205 40 26 25 19
Sub-total 5,743 5,999 8,186 8,570 8,659 8,787 8,929 9,287
local Roads (Iom)
Paved 418 567 649 1,011 1,403 2,846 3,450 3,952
Gravel 17,671 17,874 21,863 23,953 26,803 25,333 27,110 26,848
TJnrepaired 3,317 3,787 4.104 3,629 3.380 3,669 3,378 3,495
Sub-total 21,426 22,146 26,614 28,596 31,586 31,848 33,938 34,294
Total (km,
Paved 1,275 1,627 2,092 2,970 3,864 5,789 6,769 7,820
Gravel 22,510 22,723 28,511 30,362 32,961 31,151 32,696 32,247
Unrepaired 3,383 3.794 4,170 3,836 3_6920 5 3.1403 3,514
Grand Total 27,169 28,145 34,800 27,168 40,245 40,635 42,868 Lj3.81
km/Xm' (km) 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.46 0.47
Source: Ministry of Construction
2. Motor Vehicle Fleet
Passenger Cars 11,074 13,00a 23,235 50,299 60,677 67,582 70,244 78,334
Buses 4,406 9,313 11,499 14,327 15,831 19,411 17,500 18,871
Trucks 13,093 16,015 22,955 40,134 48,901 53,405 55,116 64,584
Others 1/ 2,241 3,179 3.011 3.999 3,%2 5.939 7.125 8,925
Total 30.841 41.508 60,700 108.759 129.371 144.337 150.035 170,714
persons/vehicle 1,038 771 527 294 247 225 217 193
1/ Includes motor cycles.
vource: Yinistry of Transportation
TABLE 2
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
1962 21L967 1969 1970 1971
VFESSELS (Gross Tonnage)
Ocean-going: ?assenger 915 95 915 915 -
Cargo 156,844 258,337 463,440 491,143 508,000 534,689
Oil Tanker .,2h2 152,72l 275.45 248,887 328,000 31X238
Sub-total 163,001 411,973 739,810 740,954 836,ooo 865,927
Coastal: Passenger 1h,886 15,168 17,227 17,742 18,000 18,355
Cargo 42,498 66,859 85,358 96,073 97,000 93,268
Oil Tanker 34,751 3148 6 3 96,oo 972387
Sub-total 66,000 116,778 165,732 178,988 211,(000 209,000
Others: 156,485 209,924 290,638 298,948 346,ooo 389,430
TOTAL 373,099 385,486 738,675 1,196,180 1,218,811 1,2942000 1,464,357
Source: Ministry of Transportation
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KOREA TABLE 3
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Inventory of Motive Power and Rolling Stock (Actual Units)
Units as of December 31, 1973 Steam Electric
Loco- Diesel Locomotives Loco- Diesel Passenger Freight Heating
motives Mainline Shunting motives Railcars Cars Cars Cars
Total in Fleet 60 2/ 301 35 37 3/ 133 1,577 16,269 4/ 141
In Service 1/ Sub-Total 43 268 31 31 79 1,372 14,154 113
Percentag. 72 89 89 83 59 87 87 80
Under Repair 6 9 1 4 27 170 1,115 14
Awaiting Repair 11 24 3 2 27 35 1,000 14
Out of Service
Sub-Total 17 33 4 6 54 205 2,115 28
Percentage 28 11 11 17 41 13 13 20
Good - 56 22 37 10 1,207 13,117 113
Condition Fair 37 ill - - 70 26 1,760 10
Poor 23 134 13 - 53 344 1,392 18
Less than 20 Years 17
Steam Between 21 and 40 Year 43
Over 41 Years _
Less thart 10 Years 191 22 82
Between 1.1 and 20 Year 110 13 51
Diesel
Between .!1 and 30 Years - -
Age Over 31 Years
Less thani 10 Years 37
Electric
Over 11 'ears _______
Less thar 10 Years 724 9,002 107
Between 11 and 20 Year 543 2,505 6
Rolling Stock Between 21 and 30 Year 13 2,071
Between 31 and 40 Year 205 2,663 10
Over 41 Years 92 28 18
Up to 30 Tons 3,146
Carrying Capacity
of 40 Tons 6,803
Freight Cars
50 Tons 6,292
7C Tons 28
1/ Total in fleet less under or awaiting repair on the average.
2/ Excluding 33 steam locomotives stored in either workshops or running sheds.
3! In addition, KNR had 20 (under test runs) electric locomotives as of end-1973. Another 9 electric locomotives were delivered in 1974.
Furthermore, 126 electric railcars were delivered in 1974.
4/ Including privately-owned freight cars.
Source: KNR and mission estimates.
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Freight Traffic: 1974 - 1979 Forecast
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
T TK AD T TK AD T TK AD T TK AD T TK AD T TK AD
Grain 1.6 415 253 1.7 430 253 1.7 400 231 1.8 411 231 1.8 416 231 1.8 423 231
Fertilizer 1.8 509 286 1.9 544 286 2.2 624 280 2.5 711 280 2.6 733 280 2.6 739 280
Cement 8.3 1,501 180 8.9 1,604 180 9.5 1,717 180 11.7 2,097 180 13.9 2,504 180 15.4 2,777 180
Coal 14.7 3,375 229 16.6 3,802 229 17.6 4,105 233 18.6 4,391 236 19.9 4,754 239 21.1 5,055 240
Oil 3.5 844 240 3.1 745 240 4.7 1,102 233 5.2 1,209 233 5.9 1,363 233 3.7 971 233
Ore 2.2 573 256 2.8 716 256 3.1 820 261 3.4 895 261 3.7 971 261 4.1 1,073 261
Others 5.9 1,334 226 6.0 1,683 281 6.4 1,646 256 6.9 1,767 256 7.5 1,930 256 8.3 2,132 256
1. Sub-Total:Commercial 38.2 8,551 224 41.0 9,524 232 45.4 10,414 229 50.1 11,481 229 55.3 12,671 229 60.1 13,751 229
2. Military Freight 1.5 400 267 1.5 400 267 1.5 360 240 1.5 360 240 1.5 360 240 1.5 360 240
3. KNR Freight 0.9 123 137 0.9 123 137 1.0 99 99 1.0 99 99 1.0 99 99 1.0 99 99
TOTAL 40.6 9,074 224 43.4 10,047 232 47.9 10,873 227 52.6 11,940 227 57.8 13,130 227 62.6 14,210 227
Note: T = million ton
TK = million ton-km
AD = average distance in km
Source: KNR
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Passenger Traffic: 1964-1973 Actual
NUMBER OF PASSENGERS (millions) PASSENGER-KM (millions) AVERAGE DISTANCE (km)
Long Long Long
Actual Commuter Dist. Military Total Commuter Dist. Military Total Commuter Dist. Military Total
1964 32.9 83.6 2.1 118.6 731 6,107 515 7,353 22.2 73.0 250.8 62.0
1965 32.2 73.1 1.9 107.2 725 5,672 520 6,917 22.5 77.6 269.0 64.5
1966 38.4 98.0 1.9 138.3 830 7,288 546 8,664 21.6 74.4 285.0 62.7
1967 41.6 108.4 1.9 151.9 883 8,150 543 9,576 21.2 75.2 288.9 63.6
1968 38.7 110.6 1.6 150.9 828 9,280 482 10,590 21.3 83.9 301.2 70.1
1969 37.9 114.8 2.0 154.7 799 9,680 598 11,077 20.0 84.0 304.0 71.0
1970 38.2 91.4 1.7 131.3 854 8,425 539 9,818 22.4 92.2 299.L1 74.8
1971 41.4 85.2 1.6 128.2 940 7,300 510 8,750 22.7 85.7 320.0 68.3
1972 26.3 109.2 1.6 137.2 629 8,914 519 10,062 23.9 81.6 324.4 73.3
1973 22.5 118.9 1.6 143.0 552 9,681 487 10,720 24.5 81.4 304.4 75.0
Source: KNR
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
KNR Passenger Traffic: 1974 - 1979 Forecast
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
p PK AD P PK AD P PK AD P PK AD p PK AD P PK AD
SMESRS Commuter 7.3 102 14 72.1 1,153 16 94.1 1,505 16 101.6 1,626 16 110.0 1,760 16 118.5 1,896 16
Non-Commuter 4.7 91 19 48.1 769 16 65.7 1.004 15 71.0 1,136 16 76.6 1,226 16 82.8 1,325 16
Sub-Total 12.0 193 16 120.2 1.922 16 159.8 2.509 16 172.6 2.762 16 186.6 2.986 16 201.3 3.221 16
Others Commuter 20.5 502 24 16.3 391 24 18.0 432 24 20.0 480 24 22.0 528 24 24.0 576 24
Non-Commuter 60.0 1,368 23 57.5 1,323 23 63.3 1,456 23 68.3 1,912 28 73.8 2,214 30 79.7 2,391 30
Non-Commuter 55.8 8,928 160 60.3 9,648 160 65.1 10.416 160 68.4 10,944 160 71.8 11,488 160 75.4 12,064 160
Sub-Total 136.3 10,798 79 134.1 11.362 85 146.4 12.304 84 156.7 13,336 85 167.6 14,230 85 179.1 15.031 84
Military 1.5 450 300 1.5 450 300 1.5 450 300 1.5 450 300 1.5 450 300 1.5 450 300
GRAND TOTAL 149.8 11.441 76 255.8 13,734 54 307.7 15.263 50 330.8 16.548 50 355.7 17.666 50 381.9 18,702 49
Note: P = million passengers
PK = million passenger-km
AD = average distance travelled per passenger in km
Source: KNR and mission estimates.
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
SUMMARY OF OPERATING STATISTICS (ALL TRAFFIC)
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
I. SYSTEM
Route-km-Standard gauge (km) 3,073 3,073 3,086 3,086 3,086
-Narrow gauge (km) 125 125 125 47 47
-Total (km) 3,198 3,198 3,211 3,133 3,133
II. TRAFFIC
Pass-km (millions) 11,077 9,939 8,750 10,0.2 10,720
Net ton-km (milliors) 7,328 7,709 7,841 7,241 8,591
Traffic units (millions) l1/ 18,405 17,528 16,591 17,303 19,311
III. OPERATION
Train-km by mode of traction
-Steam (000's) 655 1,334 706 258 240
-Diesel (000's) 31,258 33,271 35,423 38,808 39,665
-Diesel railcar (000's) 7,921 5,770 5,833 5,463 3,967
-Electric (000's) - - - - 2,145
-Total (000's) 39,834 40,375 41,962 44,528 46,017
Train-km by service
-Passenger (000's) 23,426 23,183 24,084 27,602 27,794
-Freight (000's) 16,408 17,192 17,878 16,926 18,223
-Total (000's) 39,834 40,375 41,962 44,528 46,017
Locomotive-km
-Steam (000's) 3,744 4,659 4,516 3,180 3,295
-Diesel (000's) 38,878 40,698 43,122 46,397 46,684
-Diesel railcar (000's) 14,587 11,900 12,286 12,281 9,376
-Electric (000's) - - - - 2,336
-Total (000's) 57,209 57,257 59,924 61,858 61,691
Number of locomotives in fleet 2/
-Steam 115 109 80 80 60-
-Diesel 282 277 337 336 336
-Diesel railcar 161 156 156 156 133-,j
-Electric - - - - 37-
-Total 558 542 573 572 566
Availability of Locomotives
-Steam (%) n.a. 66 70 70 72
-Diesel (%) 86 86 88 89 89
-Diesel railcar (%) 65 67 67 68 59 y
-Electric (%) - - - - 83-
I/ Traffic unit=pass-km plus net ton-km.
_7 Excluding 33 steam locomotives stored
3/ Excluding 20 electric locomotives under test runs
4/ In December 1973
TABLE _8
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
SUMMARY OF OPERATING STATISTICS (ALL TRAFFIC)
III. OPERATION (cont'd) 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
Number of locomotives available
-Steam n.a. 72 56 56 43
-Diesel 243 238 297 2e9 299
-Diesel railcar 105 105 105 106 79
-Electric - - - - 312:
Loco.-km per loco.-day available
-Steam n.a. 177 221 156 210
-Diesel 438 468 429 425 428
-Diesel railcar 381 311 311 312 325
-Electric - - - - 388
Traffic units per locomotive
in fleet (millions) 33.0 32.3 31.3 30.3 34.1
Number of passenger cars in fleet 1,662 1,681 1,631 1 ,97 1,577
Availability of passenger cars (%) 82 85 84 87 87
Number of passenger cars available 1,355 1,433 1,375 1,389 1,372
Passenger-vehicle i-km (millions) 179.5 103.1 178.4 204.2 207.7
Passenger-vehicle-km per vehicle-day
available (km) 337 326 330 rJ74 392
Pass-km per train km 473 423 363 365 386
Pass-km per passenger-vehicle
available (millions) 7.6 6.4 5.9 6.7 .4
Pass-km per passenger-vehicle-km 62 54 49 49 52
Number of freight cars in fleet 13,994 14,407 15,189 16,808 16,2 9
Availability of freight cars (%) 88 88 89 88 87
Number of freight cars available 12,315 12,678 13,518 14,791 14,154
Freight-car-km (millions) 328.3 325.9 332.4 322.9 372.3
Freight-car-km per car-day
available (km) 73 70 67 60 72
Net Ton-km per train-km 447 448 439 428 41l
Net Ton-km per freight car
available (000's) 595 608 580 490 607
1/ In December 1973
2/ Comprising diesel railcars, passenger cars attached to diesel railcars
and locomotive-hauled passenger cars.
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROEJCT
SUIMARY OF OPERATING STATISTICS (ALL TRAFFIC)
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973
III. OPERATION (cont'd)
Number of freight cars loaded (000's) 865 846 847 782 883
Average turn-around -' of freight
cars (days) 5.2 5.5 5.8 6.9 5.8
Average load of freight cars loaded (tons) 35.4 37.4 37.8 40.4 42.8
IV. STAFF
Number of employees
-Government employee 2/ 35,192 36,067 36,067 35,914 33,748
-Semi-Government employee - 4,349 5,180 5,141- 5,125 4,528
-Temporary 4,767 2,585 2,430 3,305 2,926
-Total 44,308 43,832 43,638 44,344 41,202
Traffic Units per employee (000's) 415 400 380 390 469
1/ Number of freight cars available divided by number of
freight cars loaded daily.
2/ For workshop, hospital ard dining room
Source: KNR and mission estimates
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Korean National Railroad
The %nvcutmant Plan 1975-1976
US$1 - Won 485
UNIT: US$ in thousands, Won(W) in millions
Total Expenditure for
1975-1976 1975 1976
Local Fo.e..i Total Local Formign Total Local Foreion Total
N uS$ W w US$ w w us$ w
PART A. Carryover of IvnestGents Financed under the
Third Railway Loan (Credit 183/Loan 669-KO)
(a) S.ool-Onnan Microwave System 1,002 2,377 2,155 1,002 2,377 2,155 - -
(b) Consultants' Service
(i) Accounting Moderni.stion - 300 146 - 300 146 -
(ii) microwve Systes-
Sob-Total, Item A(b) - 300 146 - 300 146
(c) KKIR Staff Training - 90 43 - 90 43
Sob-total Part A(a through c) 1,002 2,767 2,344 1,002 2,767 2,344 - - _
PART B. Carryover of Investaents Financed Under the
Fourth Railway Loan (Loan 863-KO)
(a) Rail Renewal (130.9km) 441 - 441 441 - 441 - - -
(b) Traok KSilt-namce Eqoip-met 2 400 196 2 400 196
(c) Bridge Strengthenfig (2,446 tons) 484 1,788 1,351 484 1,788 1,351
(d) Passenger Cars
(i) Ordinary Passenger Cars (79) 70 5 708 2,836 70 5,703 2,836 - _ _
(ii) Special Passenger Cars (19) 8 5.771 2807 8 5,771 2807 -
Sob-total Part B(d) 78 11,474 5,643 78 11,474 5,643
(e) Improvement to Existing Running Shads 08 1,000 573 60 1,000 573
(f) Improvement to Existing Workshopa 194 1,760 1,048 194 1,760 1,048
(g) Freight Car Workshops at Je Cheon and K. Ta (Susan) 507 1.230 1.104 507 1,230 .104
S.b-total, Part B(a through g) 1.794 17,652 10,356 1,794 17,652 10,356
PART C. Investments Otber Than A and B
1. New Line Construction 597 - 597 597 - 597
2. Electrification
(a) Industrial Lines Electrification (70.5km) 920 6,288 5,970 920 6,788 3,970 - _ _
(b) Seoul Suburban Electrification 825 2.908 21235 825 2,908 2.235
Sub-total Part C-2(a & b) 1,745 9,196 6,205 1,745 9,196 6,205 - - -
/ In this table, bridge girders, passenger cars, freight cars, except 500 gondola cars procured in 1974, spare parts for passenger cars and freight cars and
plant and machinery for motive power and rolling stock repair facilities have been taken as fully imported.
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJET
Korean National Railroad
The Investm.ent Plan 1975-1976 (continued)
U4S$ 1 - Won 485
UNIT: US$ in thousands, Won (W) in millions
Total ESpanditure for
1975-1976 1975 1976
Local Foreign Total Local Forei Total Wegg Foreian Total
us5$ N V US$ N N 118$ ii
3. Increase in Station and Line Canacity
(a) Signalling 5,550 7,642 9,256 2,156 7,642 5,862 3,394 
- 3,394
(b) Double Tracking (27.3k1) 4,431 - 4,431 1,517 - 1,517 2,914 
- 2,914
(c) Marshalling Yard (3 yards) 2,795 1,296 3,424 411 - 411 2,384 
1,296 3,013
(d) Stat'on Yard Entension (7 stations) 2,149 - 2,149 843 - 843 1,3Q6 
- 1,306
(a) Station Buildtng (3 Major Stations and Others) 1,274 - 1,274 764 - 764 510 -
510
(f) Short Cut Line (2 junctions) 433 116 489 212 - 212 221 116 
277
(g) Installation of Crossing Loop (15 stations) 1,706 262 1,833 1,025 - 1,025 681 262 
808
(h) Lengthenine of Crossing Loop (10 stations) 808 - 808 401 - 401 407 - 407
Sub-total, Part C-3 (a through h) 19,146 .9,316 23,664 7,329 7,642 11,035 11,817 1,674 
12,629
4. Way and Structure Renewals and Inprovement
(a) Rail Renewal (153.5 -ki) 444 5,132 2,933 - - - 444 5,132 
2,933
(b) Complete Track Renewal (80 kh) 2,644 2,640 3,924 - - - 2,644 
2,640 3,924
(c) Point and Crossing Improvement (390 sets) 612 690 947 - 247 120 612 443 
827
(d) Concrete Sleeper (152,000) 1,986 - 1,986 786 - 786 1,200 - 1,200
(a) Ballast (500,000 nu.m) 1,320 - 1,320 577 - 577 743 -
743
(f) Track Maintenance Equipment 271 1,650 1,071 68 1,100 601 223 550 
470
(g) Bridge Strengthening (5,900 tone) 1,180 4,543 3,384 560 2,156 1,606 620 2,387 
1,778
(h) Miscellaneous Works 806 - 806 546 - 546 260 _ 260
Sub-total, Pert C-4 (a through h) 9,263 14,655 16,371 2,537 3,503 4,236 6,726 11,152 12,135
5. Motie Power end Rolling Stock
(a) Diesel Locomotives (50) spare parts and repowering 291 50,372 24,719 120 25,136 12,311 171 25,236 12,408
(b) Electric Locomotives (10) and spare parts _,' 254 11,629 5,894 235 1,212 823 19 10,417 5,071
(c) Ordinary Passenger Cars (150) and wheel sets (200) 114 18,440 9,057 85 6,264 3,123 29 12,176 5,934
(d) Freight Cars (2,000)and wheel sets. (2,000) 3/ 4,115 44,140 21,643 3,081 11,244 8,534 1,034 24,896 13,109
(e) Heating Care (25) and (other) equipment 597 1,379 1,265 374 617 673 223 762 
592
(f) Rail cars (miscellaneous equipment) 2.002 1.100 2.536 L$62 1 2.160 376 - 376
Sub-total, Part C-5 (a through f) 7,373 119,060 65,114 5,521 45,573 27,624 1,852 73,487 
37,490
3, KMR have placed an order for 24 Il-ctric Locomotives, 10'vill be delivered by 1976, 7 more were justified and justification
for balance of 7 will be submitted by KIR.
;/ 500 cars were acquired in 1974 and financed by Govarent, out of the balance of 1500 cars, 1000 cars will be 
acquired initially and the balance in
consultation with the bank after a review to be made by early 1976,
TABLE 9
Page 3 of 3
KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Korean National Railroad
The Investment Plani 1915-1976 (continued)
US$ 1 = Won 485
UNIT: HSa in thousands, Won (W) in millions
Total Expenditure for
1975-1976 1975 1976
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
ITEM N US$ N f 119$ N N 118$ N
6. Motive Power end Rolling Stock Repair Facilities
(a) Improvement to Existing Running Sheds 55 550 322 - 550 267 55 - 55
(b) Freight Car Workshop at Hae Dek 561 2,035 1.548 5 61_2_0_ _ 5.35 1,548
Shb-total, C-6 (a and b) 616 2,585 1,870 - 550 267 616 2,035 1,603
7. Mise.llaneous
(a) Telecommunicatio.s 843 _ 843 - _ - 843 - 843
(b) Electric Power 276 - 276 15 - 15 261 - 261
(c) Technical Adviser - 200 98 - 100 49 - 100 49
(d) KNR Staff Training - 100 48 - 50 24 - 50 24
(e) Miscellaneous including procurement of ticket
printing machines, housing and other works 1.549 440 1.762 580 - 580 969 440 1.182
Sub-total, Part C-7 (a through ) 668 740 3.028 595 150 668 2.073 590 2.360
Sub-total, Part C (1 through 7) 41.408 155.552 116.849_- 18.324 66.614 50;632 23.084 88.938 66.217
Total of Parts A. B and C 44,204 175,971 129,549 21,120 87,033 63,332 23,084 88,938 66,217
Contingencies
(a) Physical (107%) j/ 3,961 5,739 6,744: 1,776 3,805 3,621 2,185 1,934 3,123
(b) Price S/ 6,298 26,896 19,342 966 10.444 6.031 5,332 16,452 13,311
Sub-Total, (a and b) 10,259 32,635 26.086 2.742 14,249 9,652 7,517 18,386 16.434
GRAND TOTAL 54,463 208,606 155,635 23,862 101,282 72,984 30,601 107,324 82,651
1/ Only applicable to Part C. However, souls for 50 diesel locomotives, 10 electric locomotives, 150 ordinary passenger cars, all wheel sets and
2,000 freight cars have been excluded.
2/ For Civil Works, 167, increase for 1975 and 147. for 1976 has been anolied for local costs except for items for which firm contracts have already been awarded
(valued at Won 15 billiom) in 1975. 12% increase for 1975 and 10% increase for 1976 has been applied to: (i) local and foreign costs for equipment end (ii)
foreign exchange for civil works.
Hgrch 1975
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
The Froject 1735-1976 1,
US$1 Woe 485
UNIT - L9S in thousands, Wo- (W) ir oillitoo
Total Expenditure for
1975-1976 1975 1976
ITMY Local Foreta Total Local Foreico Total LoocI Foreign Total
A 2sb 9 9 US9 9 5 TbS 9
NWeu Line Coo.teectioc
(a) Icd.eciA1a Sidi-oc (3.0 kb) 397 - 397 397 - 397 - - -
(b) Coal SOiidcs j3 ks) 200 - 200 200 200 - _ _
Sob-Total, Itern 1( & b) 597 - 597 597 - 597
2. Electrificatino
(a) Tadeotrial Limes Rleotrifioatioo
(1) Veong Pang Lie- (about 71 ke) 920 6,288 3,970 920 6,298 3.970 - - -
(b) Seoul Sohorb-e tleltrifioatiea 825 22 1 2.235 825 2.908 2235
Sob-Total, items 2 (a & b) 1,745 9,196 6,205 1,745 9,196 6,205
3. Ioreaae in Statioc sod Lice CaoPoitv
(a) sir.allioc
(iM Seeul CIC System (24 atatira., 97.9 ks) 1,300 7,642 5,006 1,300 7,642 5,006
B.sa. aboat 10 kn) 3,213 - 3,213 353 - 353 2,860 - 2,860
(iii) Autoa tic Traie Stoecioc Syotem 487 - 487 135 - 155 332 - 332
(iv) St-tio Sig-olli.$ taproocamote (15 etctioca) 30 - 30 10 - 10 20 - 20
(v) Level oco.e.ig (25 atetio-a) 520 - 520 338 - 338 182 - 182
Sub-Total, Itar 3(a) 5,550 7.642 9,256 2;156 7,642 5,862 3,394 3,394
(b) Double Treokioc
(i) So Nam Li.. (-boot 21 kb) 2,385 - 2,385 885 - 585 1,500 - 1,500
(ii) Tse Boeg Lice (about 6.3 k4) 2.046 - 2 046 632 - 632 1.414 - 1.414
Sob-Total, Itec 3 (b) 4,431 - 4,431 1,517 - 1,517 2,914 - 2,914
(o) Mat-halliog YaTd
Mi) HSe Dk (a.but 200 tare) 397 773 771 - - - 397 773 771
(ii) J. Cheon (about 5BO tare) 898 523 1,153 411 - 411 487 523 742
(iii) Bu Gok (about 500 care) 1 500 _ 1 500 - -_ 1,500 - 1.500
Sob-Total, Item 3(c) 2,795 1,296 3,424 411 - 411 2,384 1,296 3,013
(d) Station Yard tcteat.oe (7 stations) 2,149 - 2,149 843 - 843 1,306 - 1,306
(e) Statioc 5uildinp(3 major atatione cad othere) 1,274 - 1,274 76b - 764 510 - 510
(f) Byppoc Lic-a (2 juorti-oo) 433 116 409 212 - 212 221 116 277
(8) sot-allatior ef Crossing Loope(eboot 15 etetica.) 1,706 262 1,833 1,025 - 1,025 681 262 808
(h) Lengthening of CenSniog L.oop(abost 10 statioos) 808 _ 808 401 - 401 407 - 407
SRb-Total, It.e- 3(a thbrogh h) 19,146 9,316 23,664 7,329' 7,642 11,035 11,817 1,674 12,629
1/ In thi- table, bridge girdoe., p.a.e.ge- tarn, freight c-c ee.ept 500 Goodol care procur-d it 1974,
space ports fot pMaccager ar- and freiglt osre and plant and machinery for ective po.or ard rollieg
etook repair focilitisb hboo been t ke as folly ipo-ted.
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Th, P-r-oet 1 75-1 76 -/ US$1 = Won 485
UNIT-US$ in thousands, Won(W) in millions
Total SE.poditores for
1975-1976 1975 1976
Local Foreigzn ftal Lonal Poreign Total LocaI Foreign Total
4. Way & Structure Renewals and IrnUSve,eet I 05$ 1W W us$ W W US$ W
(a) Rail Ren-wel (abant 155.5 kn) 444 5,132 2,933 - - - 444 5,132 2,933
(b) Complete Track Renewal (about 80 ko) 2,644 2,640 3,924 - - - 2,644 2,640 3,924
(c) Points nod Crossinge Improvenent (abnat 390 seto) 612 690 947 - 247 120 612 443 827
(d) Concrete Sloepera (about 152,000) 1,986 - 1,986 786 - 786 1,200 - 1,200
(e) Ballast (.bout 500,000 ca.m) 1,320 - 1,320 577 - 577 743 - 743
(f) Track Maintenance Equipmeat
(ii Equipmalnt 68 1,100 601 68 1,l00 601 - -
( i) Spare Parts fni 55n 470 -_ _n3 550 470
Slb-Total, It-e 4(f) 271 1,650 1,071 68 1,100 601 203 550 470
(i) Bridge Strengthening and renewoals (5,900 tons) 1,180 4,543 3,384 560 2,156 1,606 620 2,387 1,778
(h) Hiecellanenue 806 - 806 546 - 546 260 - 260
Sub-Total, Iten 4 (a through h) 9,263 14,655 16,371 2,537 3,503 L,236 6,726 11,152 12,135
5. Motive Power & Rolling Stock
(o) Diesel Locomotives
(i) Diesel Loncantivas (53) 153 25,000 12,275 120 20,000 9,820 33 5,000 2,455
(ii) Re-Powering (52 diesel locomotive.) 120 17,100 8,414 - 1,000 485 120 16,100 7,929
(iii) Spare Pacts for lainte.ance Not-alieation 18 8.272 4.030 - 4,136 2,006 18 4.136 2.024
Sub-Total past 5(a) 291 50,372 24,719 120 25,136 12,311 171 25,236 12,408
(b) Electric Loeom-tiv-n
(i) Eleotric Loconotives (10) 19 10,417 5,071 - - - 19 10,417 5,071
(ii) Spare Parts 235 1,212 823 235 1,212 823 - _ -
Sob-Total, Item 5(b) 254 11,629 5,894 235 1,212 823 19 10,417 5,071
(c) Passenger Care
(i) Ordinary passenger car (150 cars) 29 18,000 8,759 10 6,000 2,920 19 12,000 5,839
(ii) Wheel sets fPr Maintenance (200) 85 440 298 75 264 203 10 176 95
Sob-Total, Item 5(c) 114 18,440 9,057 85 6,264 3,123 29 12,176 5,934
(d) Freight Cars
(1) aoa ccar (400) 44 10,400 5,088 22 5,200 2,544 22 5,200 2,544
(ii) Gondola (9,10) 98 22,000 10,768 45 3,800 1,888 53 10,700 8,880
(iii) Wheelsets for Maintenance Normalization (2000) 551 3,740 2,365 14 2,244 1,102 537 1,496 1,263
(iv) 590 cars acqoired do 1974 (Financed by Govt.) 3.422 - 3.422 3,000 - 3,000 422 - 422
Sob-Total, Item 5(d) 4,115 36,140 21,643 3,081 11,244 8,534 1,034 24,896 13,109
(e) Heatin8 Cars
(i) Rebuilding (25 rare) 300 908 740 120 363 296 105 545 444
(ii) Replacement of Heating Equipmeet (13 natr) 297 471 525 254 254 377 43 217 148
Sob-Total., Item 5(e) 597 1,379 1,265 374 617 673 223 762 592
(f) Miseellaneous - including rebuilding 50 container cars 2 002 1.100 2,536 1.626 1.100 2.160 376 - 376
and 200 cabooses and reengining of 20 rail care
Sob-Total, Item 5 (a through f) 7,373 117,960 64,580 5,521 45,573 27,624 1,852 72,387 36,956
6. Motive power & Rolling Stock Repair Facilities
(a) Improvempent to REisting Running Sheds 55 550 322 - 550 267 55 - 55
(b) Freight Car Workshop at iae Dok 561 2.035 1.548 - - - 561 2,035 1,548
Sub-Total, Ite 6 (a and b) 616 2,585 1,870 - 550 267 616 2,035 1,603
In this table, bridge girders, passenger earn, freight car, accept 500 gondola care procured in 1974
spare parts for passenger cars and freight cars and plant and machinery for notive power and rolling
stock repair facilities have been assamed as fully imported.
TABLE 10
Page 3 of 3
KORE
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTP' RAILWAY PROJECT
THE PROJECT 1975-1976
Total Expeoditursa for 1975 1976
1975-1976 1975 1976
Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total
7. Miscellaneoos W US$ W US$ W 1S$ W us$ w
(a) Telecommuoicatioos 843 8 643 - - - 843 - 843
(b) Electric Power 276 - 276 15 - 15 261 - 261
(a) Technical Advisor - 200 98 - 100 49 - 100 49
(d) KKNR Staff Training - 100 49 - 50 24 - 50 25
Me) iscellaneous including replacirg ticket printing achioeo 1,549 440 1.762 580 - 580 969 440 1.182
Sub-Total, Iteo 7(a through e) 2,668 740 3,028 595 150 668 2,073 590 2,360
8. Total. Itss (1-7) 41,408 155,552 116.849 18,324 66.614 50632 23.084 88.938 66.217
9. Contingencies
(a) Physical 10% 3,961 5,739 6,744 1,776 3,805 3,621 2,185 1,934 3.123
(b) Price 6.6298 23.789 17,635 . q^s 7,337 4,524 5,332 16,452 13,311
Sub-Total, Ites 9 (a and b) 10,259 29,526 24,579 2,742 11,142 8,145 7,517 18,386 16,434
11. GRAND TOTAL 51,667 185,080 141,428 21,066 77,756 58,777 30,601 107,324 82,651
1/ Is this table, bridge girdera, paseseger cars, freight cars eccept 500 gondola cars procurred in 1974, apace parts for passenger cars, freight
tcor and plant and machinery for motive power and rolling stock repair facilities have been aosumed as fully imported.
2/ Costs of 50 diesel locomotives, 10 electric locomotives, 150 passenger cars, all wheel sets and 2000 freight cars have bee. excluded.
For civil works, 16% increase for 1975 and 14% increase for 1976 has been applied for local costs accept for item for which fire contracts
have already Seen awarded in 1975 (valued at won 15 billion)212% increase for 1975 and 10% increase for 1976 has been applied to
(i) local and foreign costs for equipmnt and (ii) foreign exchange for civil works.
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Items Financed under the Loan
Amount
Item US$ Million
1. Track Materials and equipment
- 50 kg/m rails (about 23,550 tons) 7.8
- 37 kg/m rails (about 5,073 tons) 1.7
- taterials for :points and crossings 0.7
- Track maintenance equipment 1.1
- Spare parts for track maintenance equipment purchased
under the third and fourth loans 0.5
Sub-Total 11.8
2. Fabricated bridge girders (about 5,900 tons) 4.5
3. Spare parts for diesel locomotives 8.2
4. Passenger cars
- 150 ordinary passenger cars 18.0
- about 200 wheetlsets 
-. 5
Sub-lTotal 18.5
5. Freight cars
- 400 box cars 10.4h
-1100 gondola cars 22.0
- about 2,000 wheelsets 3.7
Sub-Total 36.1
6. Component for rebuilding heating cars and replacing
heating equipment of heating cars 1.4
7. Plant and machinery for workshops and running sheds
2.*6
8. Services of a technical adviser 0.2
9. KNR staff train:ing 0.1
10. Contingencies 16.6
11. GRAND TOTAL 100.0
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Estimated Schedule of Disbursement
IBRD Fiscal Year Cumulative Disbursement.
and Quarter at end of Quarter
US$ million
1975/76
September 30, 1975
December 31, 1975 2.1
March 31, 1976 14.8
June 30, 1976 35.4
1 976/77
September 30, 1976 57.4
December 31, 1976 80.0
March 31, 1977 95.o
June 30, 1977 98.0
1977/78
September 30, 1977 100 .0
Principal Assumptions:
1. Effective date of Loan: Not later than July 15, 1975
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APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RaILWAY PROJECT
Income Statement
1969-1979
(Won Billions)
Actual Forecast
Fiscal
uec 31 operating Revenues 1969 1970 1971- 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
2/Passenger Revenue 18.1 19.4 17.3 20.7 22.8 29.9 39.3 44.9 ',.5 51.9 55.0Freight Revenues 11.1 11.1 11.6 13.3 15.7 20.1 Z6.6 28.3 31.6 34.7 37.7Other Trai. Pc:enues 2.5 2.5 1.5 1,7 2.4 3.0 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.9
Miscellaneous 
- - 0.8 0.6 n.7 2.o _.2 1.0.5 .79
Total Operating Revenue 31.7 33.0 31.2 36.3 41.6 5305 70J.0 78,1 i4.0 92.0
Add: ( Pa) Fss Fare Increase 2.9 10% 10.5 1)4 15.7 105, 24.0 10^. 25.3(%) Frt. Rate Increase 
_7- 107 7.6 175 t6,4 20% 23.2 1O0% 24.3 5%Sub Total 49 19j '2.1 47.2 53.1
Restated Operating Revenues 31.7 33.0 31.2 36.3 41.6 53.5 _ 19 9 1i.l _ 139.2 1i',3
Less: Operatitng Expenses
Labor 13.2 
-;1 14 3 1 77 24.4 ,3. 12.3 36.3
FPoel 
.. 9 6.: 6.3 12.1 1.7 lb.7 i3.2 20 n 1.9
I*terials & Supplies 7. 3. 8.0 1 15.3 2 0.4.
All Other 3.4 4.1 5.4 6.I _ .2 12.4 93.8
Total Cash Expenses 20,2 23.S 27.8 30.0 34.0 '6 ' .3 17.' 65.7 95.1 105,5
Add: Depreciation 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9 __, _ 5. 7.3 9 12.0 13.1
Total Operating Expenses 23.9 27.7 31.8 34.5 38.9 54. ŽS 
-; . 107.1 118.7
Net Operating Revenue (Loss) 7.9 5.3 (0.6) 1.8 2.7 o%,j_.3 g s _ 1.5 32.1 33.6
Less; Interest Charges 1.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 6.5 6.9 11.9 t5.7 24.1 26.2 29.0
Net Revenue - Railway Operations 6.3 3.5 (3.9) (4.0) (3.8) (7.2) (7.6) 6.3) (4.6) 5.9 4. 6
Other Revenue/Expense
Non-Operating Revenue 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.2 234 2 7 2.5 3.0 3,5
Non-Operating Expense 1 3) (0,5; (0.1) (0.6i 0) i .0) (u. 7) (0.8) 0.8)
Non-6.o3c rise Frroense 
___________ (0 3) {n 4 (4 
- U' ) 1._ J ,ss.9) (0.9)
Other Revenue/Fxpense Net ,1.8) (0.5' (0.7) 0.1 (3.3) 2.7 1 1.3 1.3
Net Revenue - (Tcflcit) 
-;.5 (.1) (, 9) (S 9)7) 7 7.2) (6.4)Add- R OR , ub sidv 
- - . 3 _ 
_ _
Net Income - Adjusted 4.5 3.0 t4.6) (3.9i $3.6) ' 1) U (3.71 7..
Add: Depreciation 3.6 3.9 _ 4.0 4.5 4.9 7.3 9. _ i__ 9 12.0
Total Cash Income 8.1 6.9 (0.6' 0.6 0 6 _ 2 
__ 7 2 19.2 - i,
Operating Ratio i 75 84 102 95 97 10' 94 77 78
Interest Charge Coverage 
- 0.3 a.4 - .4 1.2 1.2Debt Sceviec 3.t *.7 - 0.5 u.5 u y 1.2 1.3Return 0.s Net FtxlO i6 iset 7 '.4 2.9 
_ 0.9 .3t 5.9 5.8
1/ Partial compensation for revenues foregon. de to no: iniple-enting general rate increases in 1973.
2/ 1975 - 1979 figures at 1974 tariffs. S-
3/ Largely a loss en foreign exchange fluctuations.
N.B. - ( ) Indicates Deficit.
Source: Actual. OINR t7naudited (1973 are audited figureE)
Forecast, KXRN Staff and mission.
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTII RAILWAY PROJECT
BALANCE SHEETS
1969-1979
(Won Billions)
Fiscal
Dec. 31 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Actual Forecast
Current Assets
Cash 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.0 1,6 1.9 2.0 2.4 3.0
Accounts Receivable - - 3.6 4.5 3.3 4.9 6.2 8.2 9.8 11.2
Total Quick Assets 0.5 0.2 0.5 4.0 5.9 4.3 6.5 8.1 10.2 12.2 14.2
Inventory 6.5 6.8 11.2 3.7 4.0 7.3 9.9 12.2 13.5 15.0 16.6
Total Current Assets 7.0 7.0 11.7 7.7 9.9 11.6 16.4 20.3 23.7 27.2 30.8
Current Liabilities
Current portion of long-term debit - 2.3 2.3 2.8 2.8 4.0 3.9 4.0 4.0
Accounts Payable - - 12.0 11.8 8.6 8.8 11.2 14.2 16.2 16.6
All Other 5.3 4.2 4.5 4.6 _4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1
Total Current Liabilities 7.7 10.6 16.4 19.6 18.3 15 9 16.2 19.9 23.0 25.2 25.7
Net Working Capital (0.7) (3.6) (4.7) (11.9) (8.4) (4.3) 0.2 0.4 0.7 2.0 5.1
Fixed Assets
Fixed Assets 173.1 197.4 207.1 257. 7 328.4 409.0 460.4 504. 5 555.2
Land 33.9 33.7 110.2 130; , 130.2 130.2 130.2 130.2 130.2
Gross Book Value 184.2 192.8 207.0 231.1 337.3 A1879 458.6 539.2 590.6 534.7 685.4
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 9.7 13.3 17.0 25.8 25.8 36,6 43.9 53.1 64.0 76.0 89.1
Net Book Value 174.5 TM= 1 79.5 205.3 311.5 ! rF ;7 556.157 _W0.F
Add: Construction in Progress 8.9 7.2 6.5 24.5 29.1 25,7 28.0 30.0 30.0 28.0 26.0
total Net Fixed Assets 183.4 186.7 196.5 229.8 340.6 377,0 442.7 516.1 556.6 586.7 622.3
Deferred Assets / 4.4 5.0 32.5 - - 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0
Other Assets
Assets Chgd. to Loan Acct/Not Recd. 0.4 0.1 - - - ) ) )
Investments 1.1 1.9 2.2 4.4 6.4 3.0) 3.0) 3.0) 3.0) 3.0) 3.0)
Prepaid & Other 3.7 10.5 11.6 0.1 0.1 ) ) )
Total Other Assets 5.2 12.5 13.8 4.5 6.5 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
TOTAL ASSETS 192.3 200.6 238.1 222.4 338.7 397.7 467.9 541.5 582.3 613.7 652.4
Long Term Debt 32.1 35.0 75.3 80.5 100.5 162.3 203.0 245.5 267.0 280.0 299.5
Provision for Severance Pay - - - 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.4 3.0 3.7 4.5
Goverrment Contributions - - - - - - 31.2 67.7 90.1 100.6 112.6
Eq;ity and/or Ownership 2/
Revaluation of Assets - 68.9 71.4 72.9 77.6 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1 177.1
Fixed Capital (Cash or in kind) 73.2 73.2 73.2 69.7 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9 69.9
Accumulated Surplus (Deficit) 18.1 21.0 16.7 (6.4) (10.1) (13.4) (15.2) (21.1) (24.8) (17.6) (11.2)
Total Equity and/or Ownership 160.2 165.6 162.8 140.9 236.9 233.6 231.8 225.9 222.2 229.4 235.8
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 192.3 200.6 238.1 222.4 338.7 397.8 467.9 541.5 582.3 613.7 652.4
Note - ;/ Deferred loss on foreign exchange fluctuations.
2/ Every five years R.O.K. permits revaluation of land
3/ 1972 and 1973 figures adjusted accordiqg to audit reports
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APPRAISAI, OF A FIFTi RAILWAY PROJECT
Iong-term Debt as of December 31, 1973
Amount Repayment
Original Out- Interest Grace Repayment
Date V,oa n t standing Rate % period _period
USAID
- first loan ($) 1962 6,388,391 3,513,620 5.75 1 20
- second loan ($) 19S5 10,711,923 6,909,240 5.75 1 20
- third loan ($) 19S6 18,509,995 10,972,650 5.75 1 15
IDA
- Cr 25-KG ($) 1962 13,'92,924 16,872,694 5.75 1 25
- CrllO-KO (M) 1967 1o,6145,205 12,841,782 6.00 3 22
- Cr183-KG ($) 1970 15, 000,000 18,085,884 7.00 4 21
IBRD
-im 669 KO ($) l970 4,0ooos,0o 36,8914,672 7.00 4 21
-Ln 863 KO ($) 1972 40o,o0o000 
- 7.25 4 21
UK 6.75
(0) 196,1 :4 00 ,O 284,000 to 7.75 4 10
OECF (Japan)
- first loan (Y) I9i 14, 7 2,°15,168,758 5.75 1 19
- second loar. (Y) 1967 Z3 "R , )uO 2,486,533,900 5.75 1 19
- third loan (Y) 1972 15,420,000,000 5,064,780,394 5.00 5 15
KFW
- first loan (DM) 1l'70 0 ,f'.'0 323,000 5.75 7 18
- second loan (DM) 1973 17,?, 0000 - 5.75 7 18
Equivalent totals at W 103,031 tillion W 55,775 million
December 31, 1973 rate of exchan.ge
OTEF.R CREDIT GRANIT(.S
Details at December 31, 1973 were as follows:
Amount Repayment
Or1ri tl1 Out- Interest Grace Repay.
Dete Arc?i mn't, standing Rate period period
KDB
- first loan (W) 1566 18'1 i,iillion 1,492.8 million 6.00 5 15
- second loan (W) S67 1,, 1,476.8 " 6.0o 5 15
- third loan (W) 1l571 5 5,500 6.oo 5 15
- fourth loan (W) 157? 5,200 I 6.0Q 5 15
- fifth loan (W) 1573 6,210 6,210 6.oo 5 15
The 50 C/S Grp. 1569 Price I
(FF) 107,695,15 78,532,785 6 .00 2 13(Dbf 69,1475,1426 H 50,741,019 Price II
(BF) 575,320,945 ' 412,046,617 TI s 3 7
(b ) 3,171,9)40 T 2,220,243(SF) 19,'141,225 114,566,o94
Ex-Imp Bank
of the U.S. ($) 1568 5,)990.022 2,141,877 ' 6.oo - 7
Suppliers ($) 22,2028,672 " 10,989,646 " 5 25
to 6.20
Equivalent totals at W2j0;nilion W 47,090 million
December 31,1M73
rate of exchange
Yarcl, 19-75
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KOREA
APPRAISAI OF' A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
Growth in Key Financial Data
1965-1979
(Index - i'9, & 1970 equals 100)
_ Income Statement Balance Sheet
(1) (2)
Total Total Interest Net Total Total L.T. Net
Year Revenues Op. Exp. Charges Income Cash Inc. Assets Debt Equity
1969 98 93 5ik 120 107 98 96 98
1970 102 108 106 80 93 102 1o4 102
1971 97 124 194 ,123) (8) 121 225 100
1972 112 134 341 (104) 8 113 239 86
1973 129 151 382 (189) 9 172(3) 300 145(3)
1974(e) 167 199 441 (141) 5 207 510 144
1975(f) 231 275 700 (131) 32 239 606 1i42
1976(f) 297 338 924 (157) 44 276 733 139
1977(f) 358 376 1418 (9) 95 296 797 136
1978(f) 430 417 1541 192 254 312 836 141
1979(f) 47°0 462 1706 171 258 331 894 145
N.B.(e) Estimated
(f) Forecast
( ) Indicates deficits
(1) Net income after all expenses but before subsidies
(2) Cash income (net income plus depreciation). Excludes subsidies of Won 1.5,
5.9 and 3.8 bil. for the years 1973 thru 1975.
(3) The Asset base and Net Equity were increased by 98.7 billion Won ($247 million U.S.)
in 1973 due to a re-valuation of land assets.
Source:TableS 12 and 13
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KOitA
APPRAISAL 0O A FITFH RAILWAY PROJECT
Ratio Review
1969-1979
Fixed
Charge Debt Aate of
Goverage Service Return Debt/Equity
1969 3.8 X 2.9 x 4L5 17/83
1970 2.7 x 2.0 x 3.0 % 18/82
1971 (Deficit) 0.5 x - 32/68
1972 0.3 x 0.5 x 0,9 , 36/6h
1973 0.5 x 0.6 x 1.3 % 30/70
1974 (f) 0.4 x 0.5 x 1.0 % 41/59
1975 (f) 0.4 x 0,7 x 1.1 % 47/53
1976 (f) 0.6 x 0.8 x 2.1 X 52/48
1977 (f) 0.8 x 0,9 x 3.5 % 55/45
1978 (f) 1.2 x 1.2 x j4; , 5/45
1979 (f) 1.2 x x 56/44
N.B. (f) Forecast
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KOREA
APPRAISAL OF A FIFTH RAILWAY PROJECT
CASH FLOW STATEMENT 1969-1979
(Won Billions)
Actual Forecast
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
SOURCES OF FUNDS
Cash Generated By KNR
Net Operating Revenue 7.9 5.3 (0.6) 1.8 2.7 (0.3) 4.3 9.4 19.5 32.1 33.6Depreciation 3.5 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.9 5.9 7.3 9.2 10.9 12.0 13.1Net Non Operating Revenue (Expense) (1.8) (0.5) (0.7) 0.1 1.3 1.7 2.7 0.4 0.9 1.3 1.8
Total Cash Generated 9.6 8.7 2.7 6.4 8.9 7.3 14.3 19.0 31.3 45.4 48.5
Government Operating Subsidy 1.5 5.9 3.8 
- - -
_Increase in Severance Pay Provision 0.6 
- 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8Funds Provided by Government 0.5 2.5 1.5 _ 0.8 
- 31.2 36.5 22.4 10.5 12.0Borrowing:
Proposed Bank Loan 
- - - - - - 15.0 33.5 - -
Other 10.5 6.2 45.8 6.9 27.4 47.0 33.6 18.5 33.5 24.8 31.5
Total Borrowing 10.5 6.2 45.8 6.9 27.4 47.0 48.6 52.0 33.5 24.8 31.5
Decrease In Other Assets 
- - - 22.9
Total Sources of Funds 20.6 17.4 50.0 36.2 38.6 60.8 97.9 108.0 87.8 81.4 92.8
APPLICATION OF FUNDS
Capital Investment - Local Currency 15.5 23.9 30.6 17.9 17.3 17.2
- Foreign Exchange 
_ 26.8 49.1 52.0 33.5 24.8 31.5
Total Capital Investment 11.6 7.2 13.8 24.9 10.5 42.3 73.0 82.6 51.4 42.1 48.7
Debt Service - Interest Charges 1.6 1.8 3.3 5.8 6.5 6.9 11.9 15.7 24.1 26.2 29.0
- Repayment 1.2 3.3 5.5 10.7 8.0 7.9 8.5 8.3 12.1 11.7 12.0
Total Debt Service 2.8 5.1 8.8 16.5 14.5 14.8 20.4 24.0 36.2 37.9 41.o
Increase In Other Assets 0.3 7.9 28.8 
- 10.3 
- - - - -Unexplained Charges to Earned Surplus 0.7 0.1 (0.3) 0.4 2.0 - - - - -
Net Change In Working Capital 5.2 (2.9) (1.1) (5.6) 1.3 3.7 4.5 1.4 0.2 1.4 3.1
Total Application of Funds 20.6 17.4 50.0 36.2 38.6 60.8 97.9 108.0 87.8 81.4 92.8
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